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FATHER CONSTITUTION, TELL THE POLICE TO STAY
ON THEIR OWN SIDE: CAN EXTRA-JURISDICTIONAL
ARRESTS MADE IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF STATE
LAW EVER CROSS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S
"REASONABLENESS" LINE?
INTRODUCTION: SOCIETY'S PROTECTION VERSUS INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM AND PERSONAL PRIVACY
There are two sides to every story. In the context of an arrest, this
maxim is customary. First, there is the arrestee:
Being arrested and held by the police, even for a few hours, is for
most persons, awesome and frightening. Unlike other occasions on
which one may be authoritatively required to be somewhere, or do
something, an arrest abruptly subjects a person to constraint, and
removes him to unfamiliar and threatening surroundings. Moreo-
ver, this exercise of control over the person depends not just on his
willingness to comply with an impersonal directive, such as a sum-
mons or a subpoena, but on an order which a policeman issues on
the spot and stands ready then and there to back it up with force.1
Then, there is the police officer:
The police have a difficult, dangerous and often thankless job. Try-
ing to combat crime and violence and protect the public without
losing the public's trust is a formidable challenge.2
Consider this situation: Officer Green is one of two police officers
serving and protecting the small farming community of Ruraltown.
Her duties include traffic control and citation, especially on holidays
such as the Fourth of July and Memorial Day, and during the local
high school's homecoming parade. Officer Green converses with the
local public, all of whom she knows personally. One Friday night,
while on duty, Officer Green bumps into Mrs. Innocent, a friend who
owns a house in Ruraltown but works in Colossal, a large city about
thirty minutes north. Innocent informs Green about a man she wit-
nessed dealing hard drugs in Ruraltown and provides Green with a
license plate number. Green conducts some research on the car's
1. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 446 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing A.L.I.
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, COMMENTARY 290-91 (1975)). See also
RICHARD B. MCNAMARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 55-56
(1982).
2. People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 83-84 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
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owner and retrieves the alleged dealer's name and personal address.
The car is registered in Colossal. She decides to pursue the offender,
armed with probable cause to arrest.
Officer Green drives outside of her jurisdiction to the suspected
dealer's residence. Although she knows that she is not authorized by
state law to make an arrest in Colossal, Green is armed with probable
cause and wants to end the drug corruption within her town. On her
way to the accused dealer's residence, she notices that the street is
lined with houses and apartments, no streetlights, and people congre-
gating on street corners. Green pulls in front of the address and sees
one light on through a front window. Peering into the house, she no-
tices many suspects, bricks of marijuana, baggies of white powder, and
piles of cash on a table. She decides to effectuate a probable cause
arrest. She parks her car down the street and sneaks around the
house to the front door. Following her jurisdictional policies and pro-
cedures, she stands on the left of the door frame and offers a "knock
and announce." When no one responds, Officer Green barges inside
of the apartment.
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any United States
Court of Appeals has completely or precisely analyzed whether the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a de-
fendant arrested by a police officer unlawfully acting outside of the
officer's territorial jurisdiction.3 Circumventing a determination of
Fourth Amendment "reasonableness," these courts rely solely on
"federalism"; 4 however, some federal appellate courts insinuate that
flagrant violations of state extra-jurisdictional arrest 5 statutes can cer-
tainly impact the constitutional "reasonableness" of police action.6
Nevertheless, no federal appellate court has reasoned further and ac-
tually balanced the competing Fourth Amendment interests at stake.
This Comment is not advocating a bright-line Fourth Amendment
rule; nonetheless, before holding that a flagrant violation of state ex-
tra-jurisdictional arrest law does not violate a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights, a sitting court should examine certain factors, con-
duct a Fourth Amendment balancing test,7 examine the social policies
3. See infra notes 117-169 and accompanying text.
4. Id.
5. In the context of this Comment, extra-jurisdictional arrest is defined as the situation when
an officer acts in his or her official capacity outside of his or her legislatively mandated territorial
boundary.
6. See infra notes 117-169 and accompanying text.
7. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (balancing the government's legitimate
interest in protecting society versus an individual's right to personal freedom and privacy).
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behind these violated state extra-jurisdictional arrest statutes, 8 and de-
cide whether a decision based on "federalism" alone promotes a fair
and just society, judicial system, or constitution.
Many federal courts hold that, upon a showing of probable cause,
an extra-jurisdictional arrest is constitutionally reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. 9 Is justice served by this reasoning? Democratic
society at large creates and revises law, adjusting it to new social atti-
tudes and norms. 10 When law must change, society speaks through
representatives sitting in local, state, and federal governments.11 Soci-
ety codifies many well established common-law doctrines germane to
extra-jurisdictional arrest.12 Abundant authorities exist authorizing
law enforcement officers to facilitate extra-jurisdictional arrests.1 3
Other authorities define exceptions that protect police officers from
civil liability or from constitutionally unreasonable conduct for mis-
takes that occur during the extra-jurisdictional arrest procedure.1 4
These exceptions include: (1) the doctrine of citizens' arrest;1 5 (2) the
doctrine of hot pursuit;16 (3) the existence of exigent circumstances;' 7
(4) a defendant's consent to arrest;' 8 (5) governmental qualified im-
munity;19 and (6) the exceptions to the exclusionary rule.20 If a state
police officer effectuates a probable cause arrest, but directly violates
a state extra-jurisdictional arrest statute, a sitting court should, in cer-
tain circumstances, balance Fourth Amendment interests. Further-
more, a sitting court should consider statutory history and legislative
8. See Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1994).
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 194-220 and accompanying text (comparing the original construction of the
Fourth Amendment to modern-day Fourth Amendment construction).
11. The opposite is also true. When law should not change, society speaks by keeping those
representatives with similar political views in office. If society determines law must change, soci-
ety's voice is heard during re-election.
12. See generally 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-4(3) (2003) (defining "fresh pursuit" as "the
immediate pursuit of a person who is endeavoring to avoid arrest"); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-
15 (2003) (mandating when a police official may freshly pursue an offender); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/107-3 (2003) (defining when a private citizen may effectuate a legal arrest).
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 78-116 and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. Id. See also Lina D. Johnson, In Hot Pursuit, 26 How. L.J. 961 (1983) (also labeled "high
pursuit" or "fresh pursuit").
17. See infra notes 78-116 and accompanying text.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See generally Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)
(These exceptions include: 1) doctrine of inevitable discovery; 2) doctrine of independent source;
and 3) the attenuation doctrine).
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policy to resolve the constitutional "reasonableness" of the arrest. 21
This is most warranted when an officer arrests in blatant violation of
statutory authority and no other statutory or common law exception
applies. Although the United States Constitution is not the enforcer
of state law, a majority of decisions completely ignores the Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" of an officer's conduct when disposing
of constitutional claims based on unlawful, and perhaps "unreasona-
ble," extra-jurisdictional arrest.22 As California Supreme Court Jus-
tice Janice R. Brown stated in People v. McKay: "Fourth Amendment
analysis has attained a kind of perverse, irrational fixity: probable
cause equals reasonableness. '23
This Comment touches on the common-law and statutory excep-
tions to extra-jurisdictional arrest, but an in-depth discussion of each
is beyond its scope. Rather, this Comment will examine police extra-
jurisdictional arrest authority through the "reasonableness" doctrine
of the Fourth Amendment.24 Part II follows a police officer's jurisdic-
tional arrest authority from early common law, 25 through the estab-
lishment of an American police force, 26 and into modern-day police
authority.27 Part II also presents a split in the federal circuits concern-
ing the "reasonableness" of an unlawful extra-jurisdictional arrest 28
and each court's reasoning,29 focusing on a strong dissent from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.30 Part III ana-
lyzes constitutional "reasonableness" as critiqued by leading Fourth
21. See infra notes 221-257 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 117-169 and accompanying text.
23. People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 83-84 (Cal. 2002). As Justice Janice R. Brown noted in
dissent:
Only by insisting probable cause and reasonableness are synonymous can courts avoid
the socially costly consequences of the exclusionary rule. For this false peace, we pay
too high a price. We are asked to surrender our right to be protected from unreasona-
ble intrusions. Ironically, the severe sanction of the exclusionary rule has not discour-
aged unreasonable searches; it has, instead, shrunk the constitutional protection against
them .... Looking beyond probable cause and viewing reasonableness as a mandate of
independent vitality restores some measure of constitutional balance. Probable cause
and reasonable conduct are not the same thing.
Id. at 84 (Brown, J., dissenting).
24. See infra notes 170-355 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 34-65 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 78-116 and accompanying text.
28. See Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Pres. Dist., 270 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2001); Abbott v.
City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1994); Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1990).
29. See infra notes 117-169 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 165-169 and accompanying text; Abbott, 30 F.3d at 999 (Arnold, J.,
dissenting).
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Amendment scholars. 31 Part III also dissects and analyzes the current
state of federal constitutional jurisprudence showing that federal
courts, including the United States Supreme Court, take into account
compliance with state law when deciding whether some governmental
actions are constitutionally "reasonable" under the Fourth Amend-
ment.32 Finally, Part IV weighs the competing Fourth Amendment
interests when a direct violation of state extra-jurisdictional arrest law
occurs and examines the social policy behind these violated statutes. 33
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND ON POLICE EXTRA-JURISDICTIONAL
ARREST DISCRETION
A. Police Warrantless Arrests at Common Law
At common law, basic policies governed a police officer executing a
warrantless arrest:
For a misdemeanor, neither an officer nor a private person may ar-
rest. For breach of the peace, an officer or a private person may
arrest or a private citizen may arrest to prevent or terminate the
crime, or immediately after its commission. For treason or felony,
an officer may arrest if he has reasonable belief both in the commis-
sion of the crime and in the guilt of the arrestee; a private person
may arrest if the crime has actually been committed, and if he has
reasonable belief in the guilt of the arrestee.34
Before establishing a recognized police official or police force, soci-
ety expected every common and able-bodied citizen to join in a felony
pursuit upon: (1) the "hue and cry" of a felony commission; (2) the
appointment to a posse comitatus; or (3) the appointment to a group
of townsman or a "tun" established to keep a respective town safe
from crime.35 As populations grew in England, groups of "tuns" con-
glomerated and formed "tythings" 36 in order to protect citizens from
criminal activity, manage intertown problems and emergencies, and
31. See infra notes 194-220 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 225-355 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 356-388 and accompanying text.
34. Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566,
566-67 (1936) (summarizing 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 84-98 (2d ed. 1933)). See also
Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 673 (1924).
35. DAVID R. STRUCKHOFF, THE AMERICAN SHERIFF 4-5 (1994). A "tun" was a group of
townsman and was representative of the modem word "town." Id. at 4. These groups were
established even before a police official was formally recognized. Id. The King expected each
tun to solve its own problems within its respective areas. Id. Because of individual movement,
however, inter-tun (or town) problems arose because of individual action. Id.
36. Id. Groups of ten families were responsible for each town. STRUCKHOFF, supra note 35,
at 4-5.
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raise the "hue and cry" under appropriate circumstances. 37 Groups of
ten tythings merged together to form "hundreds. '38 Within each hun-
dred, the King appointed a "reeve" to serve primarily as a tax collec-
tor and law enforcer.39
As time progressed, the King divided land into "shires. ' 40 Within
each shire, the King appointed head law and tax enforcement officials
including sheriffs, 41 bailiffs, 42 constables,43 watchmen, 44 and other
King's law enforcers. 45  These officials' duties and rights to arrest
were similar to those of common citizens. 46 However, the King af-
37. Id.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4-5.
41. EDWARD C. FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST 24 (1967). The sheriff was the chief executive
officer and conservator of peace in his shire or county. Id. At common law, the sheriff was
known as the "shire's reeve." Id. A reeve was a feudal administrative officer in charge of estate
order. Id. Lord of each manor appointed each sheriff respectively. Id. When the English feudal
system broke apart, the land divided into shires and a reeve was appointed to each shire. Id. His
duties were the same but now he was the King's top law enforcement official in each shire.
FISHER, supra, at 24. The territorial jurisdiction of the sheriff acting in his official capacity was
limited to his respective shire. Id.
42. Id. at 26. The common law bailiff was an agent appointed by the feudal lords to perform
duties such as collecting rents and assisting the reeve to maintain order on each manor. Id. He
later became known as the "conservator of the peace" and assisted the sheriff in maintaining
order on each respected shire. Id. The bailiwick, or the "bailiff's village," was the territory
within which each bailiff might exercise his authority. Id. The territorial jurisdiction of the bai-
liff acting in his official capacity was limited to his respective bailiwick. FISHER, supra note 41, at
24.
43. Id. The constable, also known as "Master of the Horse," was the highest ranking King's
official at common law. Id. He was in charge of the military and some judicial functions. Id.
The constable was the highest ranking law enforcement official in a parish or township and was
assisted by the night-watch. Id. His duties included dealing with disturbances and disorders in
his respective parish. Id.
44. See FISHER, supra note 41, at 26. The watchman was a guard who, most likely at night,
kept watch in each city. Id. His responsibilities included guarding the property of each citizen.
Id. The watchmen were ineffective. Id. They were mostly "old men ... dozing in ... watch-
box[es] in the interviews between crying the hours and when .. .moving." Id. However, they
were used because of the inadequately staffed sheriff and constable system of law enforcement.
Id. The watchmen assisted the constable of each parish or township and were given the arrest
authority to take night walkers into custody until morning. FISHER, supra note 41, at 26. The
watchman is the progeny to society's modern police officer. Id. at 28. See also Hall, supra note
34, at 582.
45. See FISHER, supra note 41, at 26 (also including coroners and beadles).
46. See Wilgus, supra note 34, at 673-74 (citing 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 246-48
(1922-1923)); see also Hall, supra note 34, at 566-67. As summarized by Hall:
For a misdemeanor, neither an officer nor a private person may arrest. For breach of
the peace, an officer or a private person may arrest to prevent or terminate the crime,
or immediately after its commission. For treason or felony, an officer may arrest if he
has reasonable belief both in the commission of the crime and in the guilt of the arres-
tee; a private person may arrest if the crime has actually been committed, and if he has
reasonable belief in the guilt of the arrestee.
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forded his law enforcers greater rights when arresting based on rea-
sonable suspicion of a felony, misdemeanor, or breach of the peace. 47
In certain situations, the King's law enforcers: (1) had a duty to act;
(2) were afforded some variation of official immunity; and (3) only
had a specific territory in which to exercise their official power.48
A common-law police official differs from today's modern police
force or individual officer. Common-law police officials were com-
mon, ordinary, and private citizens compelled into service as tith-
ingmen or watchmen. 49  In England, the first recognized law
enforcement official was the "conservator of the peace."'50 English so-
ciety required these involuntary law enforcers to act in certain situa-
tions and afforded the position more legal protection.51 Compulsory
police officials had the same right to arrest as individual citizens when
acting outside of their respective town or shire 52 and society expected
Id. Therefore, the common law difference between an officer and a private citizen was whether
a felony had in fact been committed. An officer could arrest, with immunity, based on reasona-
ble suspicion that an offender committed a felony. A private citizen could not arrest, unless the
offender actually committed the felony. However, common citizens were required to assist com-
mon law constables and other law enforcement officials at the "hue and cry" of the commission
of a felony or when a posse comitatus was formed. See also ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN
URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920, 32 (1981).
47. See Hall, supra note 34, at 567.
48. Id. For example, the sheriff had to own property and reside within the county (or shire)
where he was in charge. See also STRUCKHOFF, supra note 35, at 23.
49. See Hall, supra note 34, at 580. Not all citizens were "compelled" into serving as a police
official. Id. Teachers, physicians, the poor, and the old were usually excused. Id. This position
was unpaid. Id.
50. See FISHER, supra note 41, at 21. The conservator of the peace was any citizen charged
with maintaining the King's peace. Id. at 22. They used to have minimal judicial powers for the
issuance of warrants; however, these judicial powers were passed onto "justices of the peace."
Id. This gave rise to what is comparable to today's modern police officer or sheriff. Id. at 22-23.
Justices of the peace were appointed by the King and had the authority to issue warrants and
writs and try certain types of criminal cases. Id. at 23. The creation of the justice of the peace
"was intended to correct the evils of a former system under which the sheriff acted as judge as
well as law enforcement officer." Id.
51. See FISHER, supra note 41, at 21. Police officials were persons entrusted with authority by
law and were charged with neglect of a duty for failing to act in certain circumstances. Id.
"Their actions ... are not arbitrary, but necessary, duties-not permissions-and under sever
punishments in their neglect thereof." Id. This duty to act was a distinguishing factor between
the common citizens' right to make an arrest and the police officials' duties.
52. Id. at 22. See also Hall, supra note 34, at 579. As stated by Hall:
Paramount is the fact that ... police duties were the duties of every man. Systems of
universal intergaurdianship; hue and cry that obligated all to cease work and join im-
mediately in pursuit of an offender; the liability of the hundred to answer in damages
for loss sustained by victims of criminal attack; and numerous law protective associa-
tions-all of these, and a web or related, interlocking activities and organizations, that
enlisted the services of a great majority of the men in the realm, provide the back-
ground against which the contemporary police force must be placed.
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every citizen to "join the chase" upon the "hue and cry" of a felony
commission. 53 However, the ability to arrest without a warrant only
applied to felonies.54 The law afforded common citizens some, 55 but
not all, of these same rights for warrantless arrests. 56
The use of compelled police duty led to corruption through bribes
and other manipulations.57 Society and law remedied these abuses of
authority by adapting law enforcement rights and duties to meet social
ends.58 Consequently, English society established the first official,
professional police force,59 and others followed thereafter. 60
53. Hall, supra note 34, at 579.
54. See Wilgus, supra note 34, at 673.
55. Id. at 679. A duty to arrest those who were committing felonies was imposed on anyone
who knew that such felony was imminent or actually being committed. Id.
56. Id. at 687. A private person must prove that: (1) the suspected offender was charged with
a felony that actually took place; and (2) there were reasonable grounds to believe that the
offender was guilty of that felony. Id. As noted by Wilgus:
The only question of law in the case is whether a constable having reasonable cause to
suspect a person has committed a felony may detain such person until he can be
brought before a justice of the peace to have his conduct investigated. There is this
distinction between a private individual and a constable; in order to justify the former
in causing the imprisonment of a person, he must not only make out a reasonable
ground of suspicion, but he must prove that a felony has actually been committed;
whereas a constable having reasonable ground to suspect that a felony has been com-
mitted, is authorized to detain the party suspected until inquiry can be make by the
proper authorities.
Id. at 689 (quoting Beckwith v. Philby, 108 Eng. Repr. 585 (1827)) (internal citations omitted).
Additionally,
If a felony were actually committed a person might be arrested without a warrant by
any one, if he were reasonably suspected of having committed the felony; and a consta-
ble could go further if he had reasonable ground for supposing a certain person com-
mitted the supposed felony, he might arrest him though no felony had actually been
committed.
Wilgas, supra note 34, at 689 (quoting Hadley v. Perks, L.R.1 Q.B. 444, 456 (1866)) (internal
citations omitted). This is because police officials had the right to arrest when there was reason-
able suspicion of a felony committed and the officer had reasonable suspicion that the accosted
was the one who committed said felony. Id.
57. See Hall, supra note 34, at 580 ("Protests by grand juries became common. Complaints of
bribery and misuse of office by constables nevertheless accumulated. Dismissal from an office
which meant work without pay could provide no deterrent; it would have been welcomed.").
58. Id. at 578 ("To give social meaning to the rules and to the techniques of decision, it is
necessary to supply the life-like context of human problems, purposes, and institutions within
which the rules functioned.").
59. Id. The first official police force was called the "Bow Street Runners," and was estab-
lished by the Duke of Newcastle and Henry Fielding. Id. at 580. It was composed of the best
thief catchers and was privately financed. Id.
60. Id. at 580-82. John Fielding organized the "Horse Patrol" to patrol and protect roads.
Hall, supra note 34, at 580. Then in 1796, the English Parliament passed the "Middlesex Magis-
trates Bill," which organized seven police offices. Id. at 581. Each police office was staffed by a
number of paid constables under the supervision of the magistrates and patrolled a set territory
(no more than thirty or forty miles in circumference) based on the population. Id. at 581-82.
Each constable was responsible for 18,187 people, based on average population. Id. at 582. Ad-
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Newly established police forces assigned police officials to patrol
within specific territories. 61 Along with formalizing police forces and
officials with, among other things, the establishment of exact police
borders, the law officially recognized the common-law doctrines of cit-
izens' arrest and hot pursuit because police officials could not offi-
cially arrest outside of their territory.62 Moreover, society's needs had
changed, and citizens no longer had a legal duty to assist in arresting
criminals upon the "hue and cry" of an officer or constable. 63
Beginning in early common law, through the establishment of offi-
cial police officers and into the subsequent formation of official police
forces, all law enforcers generally had a duty to act in their official
capacity and within their respective jurisdictions.64 If a police officer
acted outside of his official jurisdiction, he waived any legal protection
and acted at his own peril.65
B. Early Police Arrest Authority within the United States
At the time of the framing of the United States Constitution, and
even before the adoption of the Bill of Rights,66 England had estab-
lished a system of official law enforcers, but had not yet established
the first official police force.67 The American Colonies adopted the
English philosophy of law on arrest.68 The colonies established town-
ships and, as in England, constables and citizens patrolled their re-
spective territories. 69 Within these townships, constables patrolled
ditionally, "Each magisterial office was a separate, independent establishment, without knowl-
edge of the others' activities." Id. Moreover, "'The chief requisites of an efficient police were
unity of design and responsibility of its agents."' Id. at 584 (citing 21 HANSARD PARL. DEB.
(N.S.) 872)). Each parish was isolated from the others; there was even independent subdivision
within some parishes. Hall, supra note 34, at 584. For example, in St. Pancras, there were eigh-
teen different, isolated police establishments. Id.
61. See generally WILBUR R. MILLER, COPS AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK
AND LONDON 1830-1870 (1973).
62. Id.
63. See generally FISHER, supra note 41.
64. See supra notes 34-63 and accompanying text.
65. FISHER, supra, note 41.
66. The Fourth Amendment was ratified in 1791. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
67. See FISHER, supra note 41, at 29. The English "Bobbies" were not formed until 1829. Id.
Consequently, even though the framers probably recognized the use of official officers, the idea
of an official police force did not emerge (although some towns probably established groups of
officers unofficially). See also id. at 29 ("Policemen as such were unknown to the common law
and it was not until 1829 that the English Parliament acted to create a police formed for the City
of London.") (citing INBAU AND SOWLE, CASES & COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 596
(1964)).




geographical precincts. 70 For example, English "shires" composed the
Virginia Colony, and the King appointed a sheriff to perform the same
duties as his English counterparts.71 Because of the adoption of the
English police system, the early American police structure had three
elements: (1) limited authority; (2) decentralization; and (3) fragmen-
tation.72 The framers of the United States Constitution were unfamil-
iar with official police forces, and most likely considered the English
police official the model for the early American police official-with
the same jurisdictional rights-but without the broad use of police dis-
cretion through the general warrant. For example, the closest police
force in America during the framers' era was the "slave patrol," which
patrolled the first police "beat. '73
During the Industrial Revolution, strikes and riots led to the need
for official, full-time, salaried police forces. 74 In the states, statutes
codified the early arrest authority of official police officers and
forces. 75 The English common law of arrest comprised the basis of
these early statutes. 76 As the population grew and America ex-
panded, police authority again changed to meet socially desirable
ends: states codified police territorial arrest jurisdictions.77
C. The Extra-Jurisdictional Arrest Authority of Today's
Police Officer
Today, police officers are considered public officers of an entire
state and not mere agents of their respective local township or city. 78
Local and state police officials act on behalf of all people in a state,
not just those located in their respective jurisdictions. 79 Although
states are free to enact laws that are more protective than what the
United States Constitution requires, the federal constitution enumer-
70. Id.
71. Id. at 24. Sheriffs were wealthy landowners within the colony. The colonial sheriff was
responsible for maintaining law in his own shire jurisdiction, ran elections, and collected taxes.
Id. at 25.
72. A Brief Guide to Police History, at http://www.faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/205/
2051ect04.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
73. Id. The Carolina slave patrol established the concept of knowing every square inch for
fifteen square miles. Id.
74. Id. See also STRUCKHOFF, supra note 35, at 23-26; MILLER, supra note 61.
75. See FISHER, supra note 41, at 21.
76. See STRUCKHOFF, supra note 35, at 22. The English still controlled the colonies and, al-
though the colonies could make their own laws, they could not be in conflict with the established
laws of England.
77. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-4 (2003) (discussing the arrest by an officer from
other jurisdiction).
78. STRUCKHOFF, supra note 35, at 28.
79. Id.
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ates natural rights greater than the document itself.80 All state stat-
utes and local ordinances are balanced against the United States
Constitution and, although many state extra-jurisdictional arrest stat-
utes are more restrictive than what the federal constitution requires,
extra-jurisdictional arrest statutes are based on common-law
doctrines.81
Before continuing, one must understand and appreciate the United
States Supreme Court's general position on the use of arrest warrants.
Before searching for a defendant in the home of a third party, a police
officer must obtain a valid search warrant unless exigent circum-
stances or consent to arrest exist.82 The Fourth Amendment forbids
police officers from warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a defen-
dant's home in order to make a felony arrest unless exigent circum-
stances exist.83 Finally, an arrest based on probable cause and
effectuated in public does not require an arrest warrant even without
exigent circumstances. 84 Although a public arrest does not require an
arrest warrant and can be effectuated on probable cause alone, an ar-
rest may be constitutionally "unreasonable" if an officer violates some
explicit statute governing the arrest procedure. 85
80. See generally MCNAMARA, supra note 1.
81. See generally 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-4(3) (2003) (defining "fresh pursuit" as "the
immediate pursuit of a person who is endeavoring to avoid arrest"); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-
15 (2003) (mandating when a police official may freshly pursue an offender); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/107-3 (2003) (defining when a private citizen may effectuate a legal arrest).
82. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221-22 (1981). In Steagald, a third-party inform-
ant contacted a police officer and told the officer the whereabouts of a suspected drug trafficker.
Id. at 206. The officers went to the third-party residence of the informant and, without a search
warrant, went inside to effectuate the arrest. Id. The Court held that the search for the defen-
dant for arrest in the house of a third party was against the Fourth Amendment, at least without
the existence of exigent circumstances or a warrant. Id. at 211.
83. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980). In Payton, New York detectives arrested
the defendant, in his personal residence, armed with probable cause for murder but without an
arrest warrant. Id. at 576. The arrest was effectuated validly under the laws of New York and
the defendant appealed, arguing the New York statute violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
574-76. Distinguishing United States v. Watson, the Court agreed and held that, absent exigent
circumstances, an arrest in a defendant's home violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
without an arrest warrant, even if based on probable cause. Id. at 590-91.
84. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976). In Watson, an informant told a postal
inspector about the defendant who allegedly stole mail. Id. at 411. The postal inspector, along
with other officers, waited for the defendant at a restaurant and upon a signal arrested the defen-
dant without an arrest warrant. Id. at 412-13. The Court held that a warrantless public arrest is
valid, even absent exigent circumstances, whether or not "it was practicable to get a warrant [or]
whether the suspect was about to flee." Id. at 423-24.
85. See generally Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1990).
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Modern society continues to recognize the common-law doctrine of
citizens' arrest through state legislation.86 The doctrine of citizens' ar-
rest generally authorizes a private citizen "to act independently of any
public authority under certain circumstances. '87 Generally, the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to a private citizen's conduct be-
cause there is no direct action by a governmental power.8 8 Many
courts have held that police officers act only as private citizens when
arresting outside of their territorial boundary.89 Yet, before a citizen's
arrest by an extra-jurisdictional officer is valid, it generally must be
established that the officer did not use any aspect of the officer's offi-
cial position when arresting or collecting evidence.90
Society also preserves, through judicial opinion 9' and state statute, 92
the common law doctrine of hot pursuit. This doctrine authorizes an
86. 725 ILL CoMP. STAT. 5/107-3 (2003) (defining when a private citizen may effectuate a legal
arrest). According to the statute, "Any person may arrest another when he has reasonable
grounds to believe that an offense other than an ordinance violation is being committed." Id.
87. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CITIZEN'S ARREST: THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE
FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PRIVATE POLICE 7 (1977).
88. Id. at 7-8. However, if the private citizen is acting "for or on behalf of public authority," a
court may find sufficient governmental action for the Fourth Amendment to apply. Id. Because
of the lack of constitutional limitations on a private citizen's arrest authority, there is a policy
that encourages private citizens to act in such a way to protect themselves and others. Id. How-
ever, this policy must be weighed against the idea that private citizen's act on their own and
there is no protection for their action if they make a mistake. Id. In yesteryear, policy was
implemented to discourage citizens from taking advantage of the citizens' arrest statutes. Id.
These policies were implemented through state statutes and legislated that a private citizen acts
at his or her own peril when making an arrest. BASSIOUNI, supra note 87, at 7-8. Therefore, if a
mistake is made in the arrest, the private citizen can be civilly or criminally liable. Id. However,
today many states follow the Model Penal Code, which summarily states that "[a] private person
can perform an arrest on reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been committed, even
though not in his or her view or presence, and for a misdemeanor committed in his or her view
or presence, excluding a municipal ordinance violation." Id. at 24.
89. See generally Churney v. Vill. of Downer's Grove, 83 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Ill. 2000);
People v. Carrera, 748 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); People v. Cieslar, 710 N.E.2d 1270 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1999).
90. See Carrera, 748 N.E.2d at 652; People v. Shick, 744 N.E.2d 858 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). But
see People v. Kirvelaitis, 734 N.E.2d 524 (I1. App. Ct. 2000).
91. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (although a hot pursuit infers a
chase, it need not be an extension of "hue and cry" in and about the public streets); Warden, Md.
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (Fourth Amendment does not require police
officers to delay investigation if it would endanger their lives or the lives of others); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 (1948) ("no element of 'hot pursuit' in the arrest of one who was
not in flight, was completely surrounded by agents before she knew of their presence, who claims
without denial that she was in the bed at the time, and who made no attempt to escape."). See
generally People v. Marino, 400 N.E.2d 491 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Hutchinson, 361
N.E.2d 328 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977). See also Johnson, supra note 390.
92. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-4(3) (2003) defines "fresh pursuit" as "the immediate pursuit
of a person who is endeavoring to avoid arrest." 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-15 (2003) mandates
when a police official may freshly pursue an offender:
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officer to effectuate an arrest outside of the officer's jurisdiction in
order to stop a fleeing felon. 93 When determining whether the doc-
trine of hot pursuit applies, courts normally examine the totality of the
circumstances of each case, focusing on the immediacy and continu-
ousness of the pursuit. 94
Extra-jurisdictional arrests that violate a state statute are valid if
exigent circumstances exist. Exigent circumstances include emergency
and urgent circumstances leading to a necessary arrest.95 The Su-
preme Court has held that the existence of urgent circumstances only
validates certain warrantless arrests in cases concerning grave and se-
rious offenses. 96 Exigent circumstances generally exist when the delay
When the fact that a felony has been committed comes to the knowledge of a sheriff or
coroner, fresh pursuit shall be forthwith made after every person guilty of the felony,
by the sheriff, coroner, and all other persons who is by any one of them commanded or
summoned for that purpose; every such officer who does not do his or her duty in the
premises is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
Id.
93. See Judith V. Royster & Rory Snow Arrow Fausett, Fresh Pursuit onto Native American
Reservations: State Rights "To Pursue Savage Hostile Indian Marauders Across the Border," 59
U. CoLo. L. REV. 191, 239 (1988) ("[T]he right at common law is an extension of the power of
police officers to arrest without a warrant for felonies committed in their presence or when they
have reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect committed a felony.").
94. Id. There are generally three areas where the doctrine is applicable: intrastate fresh pur-
suit, interstate fresh pursuit, and international fresh pursuit. Id. at 244-54. Within a state, a
police municipality generally may not act outside of its own local jurisdiction unless it is ex-
pressly authorized to do so by state statute. Id. at 244. But the common law doctrine of fresh
pursuit was a judicial means of expanding a local police municipality's jurisdiction in order to
stop fleeing felons from escaping one jurisdiction and entering another. Id. at 245. Generally,
there are certain elements that must be established including: (1) the police acted without unnec-
essary delay in chasing the fleeing felon; (2) the pursuit was continuous and uninterrupted; and
(3) the time between the commitment of the crime and the commitment of the pursuit must not
be unreasonable given all of the circumstances. Id. at 245-46. Between the states, generally, a
state has no power to extend its police authority into a sister state. Royster & Fausett, supra
note 93, at 249. Officers may only effectuate an arrest of an offender in a sister state when
freshly pursuing that offender if state agreement exists. Id. The law governing the validity of the
arrest is that of the state where the arrest took place, not the state where the arresting officers
original jurisdiction was located. Id. Elements that must be established in order to validate such
arrest include: (1) an agreement between the states that authorized an interstate arrest; (2)
reasonable grounds that the offender committed a crime; (3) the pursuit must be within a rea-
sonable time after the commission of the crime; (4) continuous and uninterrupted pursuit; and
(5) the offender must be fleeing in order to avoid arrest. Id. at 250-51. Finally, the doctrine of
fresh pursuit can be incorporated into international cross-jurisdictional arrest authority. Id. at
255. The right to arrest an offender across international borders is allowed only if there is an
express agreement between the country where the crime occurred and the county where the
arrest took place. Id. at 256. Other elements of international cross-jurisdictional arrest include:
(1) the pursuit must be immediate following the offender's commission of the crime; (2) the
pursuit must be continuous without break; and (3) the pursuit must be uninterrupted. Royster &
Fausett, supra note 93, at 254.
95. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 751 (1984).
96. Id. at 751-52.
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in obtaining an arrest warrant is overruled by the need for immediate
action.97 Factors a court considers include: (1) the seriousness of the
offense; (2) the officer's belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous;
(3) probable cause to believe the suspect committed a felony; (4)
whether delay could cause the destruction of evidence; (5) whether
delay could put the officer's safety at risk; (6) the likelihood that the
offender could escape or flee; (7) whether the offense occurred re-
cently; and (8) whether there was any deliberate or unjustifiable delay
by the officer in obtaining an arrest warrant. 98 Exigent circumstances
support the reasonableness of any arrest; however, exigent circum-
stances are not dispositive of the issue.99
If an offender-or another person with apparent authority-con-
sents to arrest, an officer may legally effectuate a warrantless arrest. 1° °
Consent to arrest usually occurs in situations in which an officer ar-
rests in a personal residence. 101 An officer making an extra-jurisdic-
tional arrest may obtain consent to arrest as well.' 02
Finally, even if police officers violate a defendant's constitutional
rights, qualified immunity may shield them from personal liability. 10 3
Therefore, although an extra-jurisdictional arrest may be "unreasona-
ble," a police official may be protected from civil liability.10 4 Quali-
fied immunity shields an officer from liability if the officer acts in
good faith while arresting.10 5 The officer has the burden of establish-
ing qualified immunity.10 6 The defense applies to both warrant-sup-
ported and warrantless arrests. For the defense to apply to a
warrantless arrest, the officer must establish that "a reasonable officer
possessing the same information as the arresting officer would believe
his or her conduct was lawful," regardless of whether probable cause
to arrest existed.10 7 Moreover, an officer may obtain official immunity
if a reasonable officer would not have known that clearly established
97. 5 Am. JUR. 2D Arrest § 122 (2002).
98. Id.
99. Courts may not uphold a probable cause warrantless arrest when exigent circumstances
exist because the arrest may be "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. See generally
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 740; Jeffrey Kuras et aL, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 90 GEo. L.J. 1130,
1157-66 (2002).
100. See generally 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest §124 (2002).
101. Id.
102. Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1994).




107. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches & Seizures § 320 (2002).
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law prohibited a certain kind of search or seizure. 108 In the context of
an extra-jurisdictional arrest, an officer is therefore entitled to quali-
fied immunity if a reasonable officer would have believed that an ex-
tra-jurisdictional arrest was legal'0 9 or if a reasonable officer would
not have known that state law explicitly barred certain extra-jurisdic-
tional arrests. 1 0
The federal constitution prefers warrant-based arrests to the unbri-
dled use of general police discretion."' The Constitution, however,
does not require warrants in all circumstances."12 States are free to
enact more restrictive warrant requirements than what the federal
constitution requires."13 As a result, a breach of some state arrest stat-
utes may not give rise to a per se constitutional violation. However,
the social policy and legislative history behind some state extra-juris-
dictional arrest statutes should be examined to determine whether a
willful disregard for the statute could contemporaneously be constitu-
tionally unreasonable. 1 4 This analysis-which occurs in cases con-
cerning unwarranted home entry, search incident to arrest, and
administrative searches' 5-should also occur when examining cases
concerning flagrant violations of police officer territorial
jurisdiction." 6
108. Id.
109. This is because the officer may have believed that the arrest was sanctioned by state law,
exigent circumstances were present, it was a situation of high pursuit, or the officer reasonably
believed he or she was effectuating a valid citizens' arrest.
110. This can occur when municipalities agree to allow their respective officers to arrest in the
other's territory under certain situations and after certain steps have been followed (i.e., calling
ahead for permission).
111. See generally Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
112. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
113. See, e.g., Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Pres. Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 522 (7th Cir. 2001).
114. See infra notes 170-355 and accompanying text.
115. See generally Welsh, 466 U.S. at 740; Payton, 445 U.S. at 573.
116. See infra notes 351-385 and accompanying text.
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D. Split Reasoning Among Federal Courts of Appeals' 17
1. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Refuses to Determine Whether an Unlawful Extra-
Jurisdictional Arrest is a Per Se Violation of the Fourth
Amendment
In Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Preserve District,18 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that forest pre-
serve officers did not act unreasonably under the Fourth Amendment
even though they officially operated outside of their jurisdiction.119 In
Pasiewicz, two women riding horses early in the morning within a
state forest preserve discovered a naked man "cavorting" 120 in the
woods near a school playground.121 The women reported the incident
to the Lake County Forest Preserve. 22 Some time later, after drop-
ping off her daughter at a church, one of the women noticed a man
sitting in a car who resembled the man she saw previously in the
117. Subsequent to this Comment, two other decisions were handed down. In Kratzer v.
Kufahl, No. CIV.A. 01-2443-KHV, 2002 WL 1932003 (D. Kan. June 24, 2002), a sheriff arrested
the arrestee outside of his county's jurisdiction. Id. at *1. The arrestee argued that, under Ross
v. Neff, the sheriff violated his due process rights under the federal constitution. Id. The sheriff
argued that the plaintiff could not sustain a § 1983 claim based upon Pasiewicz v. Lake County
Forest Preserve District. Id. at *2. The court agreed with the sheriff, finding that the "'[s]tate
rather than federal courts are appropriate institutions to enforce state rules."' Id. (quoting Pyles
v. Raiser, 60 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Furthermore, in United States v. Mikulski, 317 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2003), the court continued
to rely on Pasiewicz. In that case, a detective was attempting to recover stolen property from
one county that traveled to another county. Id. at 1229. Relying on a tip, the detective, along
with three officers from one county, traveled to the next county and the detective arrested the
defendant after a long and uncomfortable process. Id. at 1229-30. The defendant attempted to
suppress the seized evidence (the recovered stolen property) by arguing that the officers
exceeded their authority by acting outside their official jurisdiction in their official capacity. Id.
at 1231. The officers further violated state statute by not notifying the law enforcement
department of the other county. Id. Although the court did not agree with the law that the
government cited for support that its seizure of evidence was valid, the court did find, in a
judicially active manner, for the government and against the plaintiff. Id. at 1233. The court
agreed with Pasiewicz and disagreed with Ross, and although the court did not condone the
officer's actions, it failed to find a federal constitutional violation. Mikulski, 317 F.3d at 1233.
These two cases blindly follow the Pasiewicz decision and its flawed reasoning and neither court
attempts to weigh the constitutional reasonableness of the officers' actions.
118. 270 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2001).
119. Id. at 527.
120. "Cavorting" is defined as "1) to bound, prance, or frisk about... ; 2) to engage in any
agile frisky extravagant showy behavior." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY (3d ed. unabridged 1981). The defendant supposedly stood in the middle of the path and
then ran into the woods after noticing the women. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 522.
121. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 522.
122. Id. (each described the man differently and only agreed to the man's height, body type,
baldness, age, and weight).
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woods.'2 3 The next day, she again spotted again the same man in the
parking lot.124 Upon subsequent personal investigation, the woman
found the suspected man's name,125 home address, and phone num-
ber.126 She turned the information over to the forest preserve rang-
ers.' 27 The rangers called Pasiewicz and left him a message. 128
Pasiewicz returned the call later that day, and the rangers asked him
to stop by the forest preserve ranger station. 129 Pasiewicz declined but
invited the rangers to his work-a local high school.130 A supervising
forest preserve ranger decided to arrest Pasiewicz 131 and sent two
rangers to the school. While in the school's athletic office, the rangers
arrested Pasiewicz for public indecency, a misdemeanor in Illinois. 132
After the arrest, the high school suspended Pasiewicz from work
because "his supervisor [thought that] given the charges, it was best he
not work around children."'1 33 After the incident, the district court
acquitted Pasiewicz. 134 Pasiewicz filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983135 claim, ar-
guing that the forest preserve officers acted "unreasonably" because
they lacked jurisdiction to make such an arrest. 136
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. Mr. Pasiewicz had children that attended the church-sponsored school and that was
the reason he was in the parking lot of the church. Id.
126. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 522. The woman obtained Mr. Pasiewicz's home address and tele-




130. Id. (Waukegan East High School is outside of the Lake County Forest Preserve Rangers'
territorial jurisdiction).
131. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 522. The supervising officer talked to the witnesses and other
forest preserve officers many times. Id.
132. Id. The officers did not specifically inquire into the incident or ask Pasiewicz about the
incident. Id. After a ten minute meeting, where the incident was not addressed, the officers
informed Pasiewicz that he was under arrest. Id. Pasiewicz called the accusation "unbelievable"
and, thereafter, he was put in handcuffs and brought to the Lake County jail. Id. He paid the
one-hundred dollar bond and was released. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 522.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 526.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
136. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 526.
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The Seventh Circuit found that the officers had probable cause to
make the arrest; 137 although they lacked territorial jurisdiction, they
did not act "unreasonably. ' 138 The court declared:
A violation of state law is not a per se violation of the Federal Con-
stitution.... [I]t would not violate the Fourth Amendment for the
Illinois Legislature to empower preserve officers to make arrests
outside of the district's physical boundaries. It is difficult to see why
an officer engaging in the same underlying act necessarily would. 139
137. Id. at 524 ("When police officers obtain information from an eyewitness or victim estab-
lishing the elements of a crime, the information is almost always sufficient to provide probable
cause for an arrest in the absence of evidence that the information, or the person providing it, is
not credible .... When probable cause has been gained from a reasonably credible victim or
eyewitness, there is no constitutional duty to investigate further."). See also Sheik-Abdi v. Mc-
Clellan, 37 F.3d 1240 (7th Cir. 1994).
138. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 526. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals split Pasiewicz's claim
into two parts: (1) the officers lacked the authority to make an extra-jurisdictional arrest; and
(2) their lack of jurisdiction rendered their conduct unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. Because there was no state precedent offering guidance, the court did not interpret the
Illinois Downstate Forest Preserve District Act, 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. 805/8(a) (2000); however,
the court argued it did not need to statutorily analyze 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. 805/8(a) because the
second premise was faulty. Id.
139. Id. The court cited to Kraushaar v. Flanigan, where the court previously held that a viola-
tion of a state strip search statute did not form a basis to establish either a substantive or proce-
dural violation of the plaintiff's federal rights. Id. (citing Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040,
1048 (7th Cir. 1995)).
In Kraushaar, the plaintiff was pulled over for appearing to be driving under the influence.
Kraushaar, 45 F.3d at 1043. The officer noticed that the defendant was making "furtive" hand
movements around his waist line. Id. The officer asked the defendant to get out of the car,
smelled alcohol, performed a field sobriety test, and patted down the defendant. Id. The officer
then asked the defendant to unbutton his pants and they fell down to his thighs, where the
officer stuck his thumb into the defendant's waistband. Id. Thereafter, the officer took the
defendant to jail and charged him with a DUI. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding "that the search did not comply with all of the requirements set forth by the state
statute governing strip searches .... [H]owever ... the state statute did not create a federally
protected liberty interest, and therefore, failure to comply with the statute's requirements was
not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 1045. The Seventh Circuit expanded into a Four-
teenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process analysis. Kraushaar, 45 F.3d at
1047. The court stated that "[the defendant's] Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."
Id. at 1047. However, under substantive due process, "the violation of state law is not itself the
violate of the Constitution ... [a] state ought to follow its law, but to treat a violation of state law
as a violation of the Constitution is to make the federal government the enforcer of state law.
State rather than federal courts are the appropriate institutions to enforce state rules." Id. at
1048. Under procedural due process, "courts will find a liberty interest only if the state's statute
or regulation used 'language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain
procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or 'must' be employed' . . . and contains substantive standards or crite-
ria for decisionmaking as opposed to vague standards that leave the decision maker with unfet-
tered discretion." Id. at 1048. The court continued and stated, "under a procedural due process
analysis, the deprivation of the liberty interest is not itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitu-
tional is the deprivation without proper process." Id. at 1049.
The court in Pasiewicz also cited to Archie v. City of Racine, where it held that a city ambu-
lance dispatcher's failure to send medical attention to a hyperventilating women who later died
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The court, however, concluded its opinion indicating certain policies
to consider:
[A]n officer can act incorrectly with regard to his jurisdiction just as
he can act incorrectly with regard to any other factor involved in the
exercise of his authority ... but the facts of this case show that the
officers did not act unreasonably under the Fourth Amendment,
even assuming they acted outside of their territorial jurisdiction.1 40
2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Concludes that an Unlawful Extra-Jurisdictional Arrest is a
Per Se Violation of the Fourth Amendment
In Ross v. Neff,141 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that county police officials did not have criminal jurisdic-
tion over a park located on Native American land.142 More impor-
tantly, the court held "a warrantless arrest executed outside of an
arresting officer's jurisdiction is analogous to a warrantless arrest
without probable cause."'1 43
In Ross, the defendant, a Native American man, allegedly drove his
car near a ball park and playground located on American Indian land
was not grounds for a constitutional tort. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 526 (citing Archie v. City of
Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988)). In reaching this holding, the court in Archie stated:
A state ought to follow its law, but to treat a violation of state law as a violation of the
Constitution is to make the federal government the enforcer of state law. State rather
than federal courts are the appropriate institutions to enforce state rules. Indeed, it is
difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court
instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.
Archie, 847 F.2d at 1217.
The fact remains, however, that the Illinois Legislature may not have wanted, and therefore
did not authorize, district police officers to make extra-jurisdictional arrests. These social and
policy considerations are considered below. The court did note a split between the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits on whether an unauthorized extra-jurisdictional arrest would be a per se violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 526 n.3.
140. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 527. The court seemed to be departing from its hard-nosed stance
in Archie and Kraushaar. The case might have come out differently if the officers knew they
lacked jurisdiction and the Waukegan Police Department specifically prohibited the two officers
from arresting Pasiewicz. This blatant disregard of state law and the chain of command could
weigh on the scales of reasonableness. In this situation, however, the police officers asked the
Waukegan Police Department for permission to make the arrest extra-jurisdictionally, even
though it may not have been authorized by Illinois state law. Id.
141. 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1990)
142. Id. at 1353. The court examined applicable federal statutory authority including: 18
U.S.C. §§ 1152 (congressional granting of general jurisdiction to some states over Indian country
within their borders); 1321 (a statutory method by which a state, with the consent of the tribe,
can assume jurisdiction over Indian country); and 1322 (allowing federal enforcement, on federal
enclaves, of state and local laws).
143. Ross, 905 F.2d at 1354 (The court expressly held that an arrest made outside of the arrest-
ing officer's jurisdiction violates the Fourth Amendment and is actionable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1990)).
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while under the influence of alcohol. 144 Another tribe member called
the county sheriff's department to "make an appearance" at the
ballpark. 145 A county officer reported to the ballpark, arrested the
defendant, and during the arrest, shot the defendant. 146 The defen-
dant sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the officer lacked juris-
diction to make an arrest and, therefore, violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. 147
The Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that the arrest-occurring
outside of the officer's jurisdiction-violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.148  The court stated: "Absent exigent circum-
stances, such an arrest is presumptively unreasonable."1 49
3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Concludes that an Unlawful Extra-Jurisdictional Arrest is
not a Per Se Violation of the Fourth Amendment
In Abbott v. City of Crocker,150 a majority of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court's de-
termination that "[an] arrest in violation of state law necessarily also
constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 51  In Abbott, an
officer observed the defendant driving a red pickup truck through a
convenience store parking lot.152 Earlier that same day, the officer
saw the same truck being driven in a fast, wild, and reckless man-
ner.' 53 The officer pulled up near the truck and noticed the defendant
acting as though intoxicated. 154 The defendant refused to pull over in
the parking lot, started to leave, and the officer followed. 155 The de-
144. Id. at 1351.
145. Id. at 1352.
146. Id. The charge was public intoxication. Id. Before the arrest, the officer and the defen-
dant scuffled and the officer shot the defendant in the leg, which was later amputated. Id.
147. Ross, 905 F.2d at 1351.
148. Id. at 1354 (concluding that "A warrantless arrest executed outside of the arresting of-
ficer's jurisdiction is analogous to a warrantless arrest without probable cause") (citing Hinshaw
v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1266 (5th Cir. 1986); Karr v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1029, 1031 (10th Cir.
1985)).
149. Id. The state law at the time of the arrest was not clear on whether state officers had
jurisdiction on the Indian land. Id. However, the court stated that even if the officer thought he
could have been there to effectuate an arrest, that would have only lent itself to a qualified
immunity defense of the officer's action and not to the underlying unreasonableness of the of-
ficer's unlawful extra-jurisdictional arrest. Id. at 1354-55.
150. 30 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1994).
151. Id. at 998.
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fendant left Crocker's city limits 156 and the pursuing Crocker police
officer allegedly requested county police for assistance. 157 The
Crocker city officer followed the truck to a house outside of the
Crocker city limits and, after an altercation, the officer arrested the
defendant. 15 8
a. Abbott's Majority Decision
The district court held that the officer violated the defendant's con-
stitutional rights by pursuing him beyond the city limits for the pur-
pose of arresting him.159 The Eighth Circuit majority reversed,
finding that a violation of state arrest authority is not a per se viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.1 60 The majority cited the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. California:161
[T]he question here is not whether the search was authorized by
state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Just as a search authorized by state
law may be an unreasonable one under that amendment, so may a
search not expressly authorized by state law be justified as a consti-
tutionally reasonable one. 162
Moreover, the majority proclaimed that some governmental con-
duct that violates certain administrative state statutes is not also nec-
essarily constitutionally unreasonable. 163 The Abbott majority held
that a police violation of a state law does not establish a Fourth
Amendment violation; however, it hinted toward some public policy
considerations when stating: "[C]ompliance with state law may well be
relevant in determin[ing] whether police conduct was reasonable for
the Fourth Amendment purposes.1' 64
156. Abbott, 30 F.3d at 996 (Crocker is a small city (a fourth-tier city) with only one police
officer on duty at any one time.).
157. Id. The mayor of Crocker testified that Crocker police policy and practice mandated that
a police officer could pursue outside of Crocker city jurisdiction as long as the police officer




160. Abbott, 30 F.3d at 998. The state conceded, however, that the officer violated Missouri
law because an officer of a fourth-class city has no authority to effectuate an arrest outside the
city limits for a municipal ordinance violation or traffic offense. Id. at 997.
161. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
162. Id. at 61.
163. Abbott, 30 F.3d at 998 (citing Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993)).
164. Id. The court argued that a violation of state law is not a per se violation of the Fourth
Amendment, but should be considered when determining reasonableness. Id. However, the
court does not determine how unreasonable the officer's action was when examining state law.
Id. The court also cited discrepancies in its rulings on whether a violation of a state law could be
a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Compare Bissonette v. Haig, 800 F.2d 812, 816 (8th
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b. Abbott's Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Judge Richard S. Arnold argued that a violation of some
state laws can, and should be, a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.165 He contended that courts should determine whether the po-
lice conduct in question was "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment:166
The key issue in determining whether a violation of state law consti-
tutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment, in the context of an
arrest, is whether the statute in question is designed to protect indi-
viduals from police behavior that would otherwise be
unreasonable. 167
Once a court determines that an officer lacked territorial jurisdic-
tion to make the arrest, the court should analyze a second factor: the
nature of the statute that the officer violated.1 68 Consequently, before
holding an extra-jurisdictional arrest reasonable, the court should con-
sider the policies and interests underlying the statutory prohibition of
such arrests. 169
Cir. 1986) (Although "[a] search authorized by state law could still be constitutionally invalid...
a search unauthorized by state law would ipso facto violate the Fourth Amendment"), with Cole
v. Neb. State Bd. of Parole, 997 F.2d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[A]n arrest by a state actor that is
not authorized by state law is actionable under § 1983 as a seizure contrary to the Fourth
Amendment.").
165. Abbott, 30 F.3d at 999 (agreeing with the majority that a violation of state law does not
automatically add up to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1990)).
166. Id. The majority noted that a violation of state law may be considered in determining
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment; however, did not determine the statutory viola-
tion here. Id. The dissent argued that reasonableness requires looking into the officer's conduct
and the purpose behind the statute which he violated. Id.
167. Id. at 1000 (citing Unites States v. Baker, 16 F.3d 854, 856 n.1 (8th Cir. 1994); Cole v.
Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993); Bissonette, 800 F.2d at 816 ("[T]he use of military
personnel to enforce domestic law, which was contrary to a federal statute, violated the Fourth
Amendment. In so holding, we looked to the federal statute in question and determined that the
policy of the statute involved was so important that the seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment.")).
168. Id.
169. Abbott, 30 F.3d. at 1000. Public policy considerations including
smaller communities are unlikely to have the resources to provide officers with proper
training in the elements of probable cause or arrest procedures. By limiting an officer's
jurisdiction to the community in which she serves, a state helps to ensure not only that
the power of the police over individuals will be appropriately restricted, but also that an
officer will be sufficiently trained for the types of arrests likely to occur in her
community.
1368
2004] TELL THE POLICE TO STAY ON THEIR OWN SIDE 1369
III. ANALYSIS
Federal law controls when deciding whether a constitutional viola-
tion occurred. 170 Additionally, a direct violation of some state arrest
statutes could contemporaneously embrace constitutionally unreason-
able conduct when analyzed under the Fourth Amendment by weigh-
ing the individual's interest in privacy and freedom from unreasonable
seizures against society's interest in protecting itself from criminal
conduct. 171 This section will discuss leading academic thought con-
cerning Fourth Amendment "reasonableness. ' 172 This section will
then analyze current majority and minority federal judiciary positions
on the constitutional "reasonableness" of state statutory violations. 73
Finally, this section will show that, in certain circumstances, state law
is examined when determining the constitutional reasonableness of
some police conduct.17 4 State law should be appraised to determine
the constitutional "reasonableness" of flagrant, unlawful extra-juris-
dictional arrests. 75
A. The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
Along with requiring probable cause to effectuate warrantless ar-
rests, the Fourth Amendment prohibits all "unreasonable" searches
and seizures. 176 The Supreme Court has suggested that an arrest is
more serious and radical than a search.1 77 The reason: One's person is
most sacred and should be guarded to the utmost against "unreasona-
ble" police conduct.178 Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" is de-
fined objectively as whether "a man of reasonable caution is in the
170. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982).
171. See Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Pres. Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 2001); Abbott,
30 F. 3d at 998.
172. See infra notes 194-220 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 221-247 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 248-258 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 259-286 and accompanying text.
176. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. See also Abbott, 30 F.3d at 997.
177. Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971).
178. See generally FISHER, supra note 41, at 14. There is a pure and natural right that "consists
in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation, and this right is safeguarded by various constitutional provisions, especially those
relating to prosecution for crime." Id.
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belief that the action taken was appropriate,"1179 in light of the particu-
lar circumstances of each case, and based on the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the search or seizure. 180
The right to personal liberty is recognized as a natural right, 181 and
the Constitution merely reaffirms central and natural rights, perpetu-
ating them for eternity within the United States. 82 However, the nat-
ural rights enumerated in the federal constitution and the Bill of
Rights are not absolute183-they must be weighed to promote the
common good of society.184 The rights to personal liberty and privacy
are constantly balanced against society's right to protect itself from
179. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (internal citations omitted) ("[S]imple 'good faith on
the part of the arresting officer is not enough' ..... If subjective good faith alone were the test,
the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects,' only in the discretion of the police.") (quoting Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
180. Id.
181. See generally McNAMARA, supra note 1. However, there is constant debate as to
whether the right to privacy is a natural right or merely a judicially created right. See generally
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); Russell Kirk, Natural Law
and the Constitution of the United States, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035 (1994).
182. See FISHER, supra note 41, at 14 (citing City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944, 945-46
(Tex. Civ. App. 1922)). Fisher stated:
The rights of the individual are not derived from governmental agencies, either munici-
pal, state or federal, or even from the Constitution. They exist inherently in every man,
by endowment of the Creator, and are merely reaffirmed in the Constitution, and re-
stricted only to the extent that they have been voluntarily surrendered by the citizen-
ship to the agencies of government. The people's right are not derived from the
government, but the government's authority comes from the people. The Constitution
but states against these rights already existing, and when legislative encroachment by
the nation, state, or municipality invade these original and permanent rights, it is the
duty of the courts to so declare, and to afford the necessary relief. The fewer restriction
that surround the individual liberties of the citizen, except those for the preservation of
the public health, safety, and morals, the more contented the people and the more
successful the democracy.
Id. Another scholar noted:
'Those great and good men foresaw that troublesome times would arise, when rulers
and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive mea-
sures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of constitu-
tional liberty would be in peril, unless established by irrepealable law. The history of
the world has taught them that what was done in the past might be attempted in the
future. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious conse-
quences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.'
Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 385 (1921)
(quoting Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)).
183. See also FISHER, supra note 41, at 16 ("No citizen has the unrestrained right to do as he
pleases regardless of the rights of others," because to allow so would lead to anarchy.).
184. Id. "Constitutional freedom means liberty regulated by law." Id. Such rights and privi-
leges are subject to reasonable control by the state for the general welfare of all citizens. Id.
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criminal behavior.185 This balance is a Fourth Amendment require-
ment.186 Arrest laws should promote public protection and safety, 187
while individual members of society should remain free from arbitrary
and unreasonable police conduct. 188
The people's voice, codified within statute and ordinance should, in
certain circumstances, be examined to determine the constitutionality
of unlawful warrantless arrests. Although the Fourth Amendment fo-
cuses on probable cause, it also maintains that searches and seizures
must be reasonable. 189 Arrest statutes curb natural rights-personal
rights-that emanate from something higher than the Constitution it-
self.190 Although states are free to establish laws that are more strin-
gent than the parameters of the federal constitution, some state
statutes merely reiterate constitutional values, common law doctrines,
or strong social policies. 191 Because the federal constitution reiterates
sacred and natural rights, a blanket prohibition against the Fourth
Amendment applying to any state arrest statutory violation, without
first examining the statute's legislative history and social policies, un-
questionably dissolves the citizenry's Fourth Amendment right to be
free from all unreasonable governmental conduct. In certain circum-
stances, state statutes are examined when determining the constitu-
tional reasonableness of state actions under the Fourth Amendment' 92
and, accordingly, some state arrest statutes should be examined when
determining whether an unlawful arrest was constitutionally reasona-
ble. Modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and legal justice can-
not be reconciled in one bright-line rule of inapplicability. 193
185. Id. at 15-16. Although the right to privacy has been in constant judicial struggle as to
whether it is a natural right, it is the right of security of the person and is commonly defined as
the right to be let alone.
186. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
187. See also FISHER, supra note 41, at 16.
188. Id.
189. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
190. FISHER, supra note 41, at 17 ("The liberty guaranteed to us by the Constitution implies
the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibition
imposed in the interests of the community.").
191. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960).
192. 1 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 234
(1996) (including inventory searches and housing and commercial administrative searches).
193. People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 83-84 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting). Justice Brown
stated:
In recent years, Fourth Amendment analysis has attained a kind of perverse, irrational
fixity: probable cause equals reasonableness. Only by insisting probable cause and rea-
sonableness are synonymous can courts avoid the socially costly consequences of the
exclusionary rule. For this false peace, we pay too high a price. We are asked to surren-
der our right to be protected from unreasonable intrusions. Ironically, the severe sanc-
tion of the exclusionary rule has not discouraged unreasonable searches; it has, instead,
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B. Modern Leading Scholars on Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness
Professor Akhil Reed Amar 194 believes that "[t]he core of the
Fourth Amendment . . . is neither warrant nor probable cause, but
reasonableness. '195 He argues that "reasonableness" is not defined by
probability: "Common sense tells us to look beyond probability to the
importance of finding what the government is looking for, the intru-
siveness of the search, the identity of the search target, [and] the avail-
ability of other means of achieving the purpose [pursued] ... 196
Society's common sense is one definition of Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness197 and common sense should be coupled with the consti-
tutional definition of reasonableness. 198 Amar concludes, "[B]y
focusing on constitutional reasonableness, [society] restores the
Fourth [Amendment] to its rightful place."' 199
Professor Thomas Davies200 believes that the "[m]odern [n]otion of
'Fourth Amendment [r]easonableness"' is based on an "overarching
reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard."' 20 ' Davies does not
shrunk the constitutional protection against them .... Looking beyond probable cause
and viewing reasonableness as a mandate of independent vitality restores some mea-
sure of constitutional balance. Probable cause and reasonable conduct are not the same
thing. Requiring the police to behave reasonably-i.e., to assess their conduct in light
of all the surrounding circumstances-is not asking too much. It is the same burden we
impose on every adult. The Constitution demands no less of the government.
Id. at 84.
194. Professor Amar is a Southmayd Professor at Yale Law School.
195. Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 801 (1994).
Professor Amar states that "because of the Court's 'preoccupation' with warrants and probable
cause-ordaining these with one hand while chiseling out exception after exception with the
other-the Justices have spent surprisingly little time self-consciously reflecting on what, exactly,
makes for a substantively unreasonable search or seizure." Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 802-03. This common sense approach should be based within society's view of
reasonableness from tort law.
198. Id. at 804. The Fourth Amendment is not just based on tort law and common sense; it is
also based within the constitutional definition of the word. Id. Amar suggests examining the
Bill of Rights "to identify constitutional values that are elements of constitutional reasonable-
ness." Amar, supra note 195, at 805. Many times, Amar believes that society's common sense
approach to reasonableness will coincide with reasonableness as examined from the Bill of
Rights. Id. The First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses under the Fourteenth Amendment should be examined when determining constitutional
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 805-11.
199. Id. at 811.
200. Professor Davies is an Associate Professor at the University of Tennessee College of
Law.
201. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MicH. L. REV. 547,
557-58 (1999). Modern readers of the Fourth Amendment assume that the framers intended for
the amendment to regulate all governmental searches and seizures. Id. If this is true, then rea-
sonableness is the only standard by which one can gauge governmental conduct. Id.
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believe that the debate is whether reasonableness is the central con-
cept in Fourth Amendment search or seizure analysis; rather, Davies
deems that the central notion is how the Fourth Amendment's reason-
ableness standard should be construed.20 2 Davies argues that no
broad reasonableness standard existed during the framers' era20 3 and
further contends that "reasonableness," as used in early Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, was not intended to create a broad rea-
sonableness standard for assessing warrantless searches and seizures
or to lead officers in their use of discretion when effectuating warrant-
less searches and seizures. 20 4 Instead, Davies believes that Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" operated to "reaffirm the common
law's general resistance to conferring discretionary authority on ordi-
nary officers. '20 5 Nevertheless, societal change transformed and mod-
ernized governing legal principles.20 6 The framers never predicted the
position society is in today and, for that reason, there is "little choice
but to treat constitutional texts as expressions of broad principles,
rather than as specific solutions to specific historical threats. ' 20 7 The
issue is "the degree to which it is possible and/or desirable to constrain
discretionary police authority by a regime of rules .... "208 Davies
rightfully concludes that "reasonableness" can never return to its orig-
inal meaning; however, "the right to be secure" was the framers' main
concern-and is where modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
should focus. 20 9
202. Id. at 559. Davies believes the Warren Court and advocates of civil liberties approach
Fourth Amendment reasonableness through a "warrant-preference" construction in which the
"use of a valid warrant-or at least compliance with the warrant standard of probable cause-is
the salient factor in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure." Id. This construction
favors the use of the exclusionary rule and allows for more judicial supervision of police conduct.
Id. The Burger Court through the Rehnquist Court have preferred a "generalized-reasonable-
ness" construction where "the value of the warrant is discounted and the constitutionality of a
search or seizure is determined simply by making a relativistic assessment of the appropriateness
of police conduct in light of the totality of the circumstances." Davies, supra note 201, at 559.
This approach allows for greater law enforcement discretion in fighting crime and disfavors the
use of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 559-60.
203. Id. at 591.
204. Id. at 724.
205. Id. The framers believed that the states would adopt workable rules concerning valid
warrant search and seizure authority and "wrote what they meant and they meant what they
wrote; they simply did not perceive the problem of search and seizure the same way that we do
[today]." Id. at 724.
206. See Davies, supra note 201, at 724-41.
207. Id. at 559.
208. Id. at 747. The change of society promoted a change in police discretionary behavior.
The main issue today should be "not whether we will allow any discretionary police authority,
but how much discretionary authority will be conferred and in what circumstances." Id. at 747-
48.
209. Id. at 750.
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Finally, Professor George C. Thomas 111210 believes that the princi-
pal concern of the Bill of Rights was the protection of American citi-
zens from an overreaching and powerful central government.2 11
Thomas argues that when the Supreme Court applied the criminal
procedure protections212 encompassed in the Fourth Amendment to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the concern "was no
longer the fear of a powerful central government but, rather, a con-
cern with the accuracy of fairness of the state processes leading to a
verdict. '2 13 By applying the Bill of Rights to the states,214 the Su-
preme Court amended and diluted society's constitutional protec-
tions.215 Furthermore, criminals wrote the Fourth Amendment for the
protection of criminals, 216 but the fear of a powerful government did
210. Professor Thomas is a Professor of Law and Judge Alexander P. Waugh, Sr. Distin-
guished Scholar.
211. George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers'
Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145 (2001).
212. Professor Thomas is referring to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
213. Thomas, supra note 211, at 150 (noting that the Court has little interest in making the
states have a difficult time obtaining criminal convictions as long as the process will produce
accurate verdicts and meet minimal fairness levels).
214. Id. at 151. This application creates a watered-down version of the Bill of Rights because
states have exclusive jurisdiction over a majority of crimes today and they need to have workable
rules of criminal procedure and a wide latitude for investigation and prosecution of these every-
day crimes. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 156. Scholars have suggested:
[T]he Framers... surely intended the Bill of Rights to permit guilty defendants go free.
After all, many of the Framers themselves had violated British law. Thus, 'many of
these [Bill of Rights] rules were written into the Constitution by real criminals fresh
from experience as smugglers, tax evaders, seditionists, and traitors' to the [British]
regime.... [M]any of the Framers would have wanted the Bill of Rights to frustrate the
prosecution or conviction of anyone charged with 'publishing any false, scandalous, and
malicious writing ... against the government of the United States.'
Id. See also Louis B. Schwartz, On Current Proposals To Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L.
REV. 157, 158 (1954). Thomas has stated:
The principle concern in the Bill of Rights was not to protect innocent defendants. The
Framers instead intended to create formidable obstacles to federal investigation and
prosecution of crime. An expansive protection against prosecution means ... that
guilty as well as innocent people go free, but the Framers expressed no concern about
this effect of the Bill of Rights.
Thomas, supra note 211, at 160. Additionally,
The crimes Americans fear most-everyday property crimes and crimes of violence-
have always been the responsibility of local police and prosecutors. The modern
Court's instinct has been to seek ways to make it easier for police and prosecutors to
solve these kinds of crimes and convict the perpetrators. But the Framers were not
concerned with the government's interest in solving crime. While we today fear
criminals, the Framers feared the central government.
Id. at 173. Thomas has also stated:
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not extend to state governments. 217 The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not trust "state legislatures and judges as completely
as the framers of the Bill of Rights. '218  Consequently, Thomas ar-
gues that the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted sepa-
rately from the Bill of Rights' criminal procedure guarantees, 219 and
state criminal protectors and enforcers of laws "should be permitted
to engage in methods that are fair but not countenanced by the Bill of
Rights. "220
These differing opinions of Fourth Amendment "reasonableness"
exemplify an ongoing debate-what the framers considered constitu-
tionally reasonable or unreasonable has changed as society has
evolved. The meaning of "reasonableness" in today's society is not
certain; however, the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights wrote in broad language allowing new interpretations to rem-
edy new societal needs, goals, and challenges. These concepts present
the basis for analyzing whether an unlawful extra-jurisdictional state
arrest can ever be contemporaneously unreasonable under the federal
constitutional.
C. Whether a Violation of State Arrest Law Can Concurrently
Violate the Fourth Amendment: Two Federal
Judiciary Interpretations
In the federal courts, schools of thought disagree about whether po-
lice compliance with state arrest law should be a factor in determining
the "reasonableness" of certain police conduct.221 In determining
which school to follow, federal courts are ultimately guided by two
factors: the circumstances surrounding a particular case, and the atti-
tudes of the sitting judge concerning Fourth Amendment "reasonable-
ness." Although a majority of federal judges believes that a police
Consider the Fourth Amendment. If protecting factual innocence were its principal
goal, no particular reason compels us to ban general warrants. Innocent people have
nothing to fear from warrants, general or otherwise. And general warrants are an effi-
cient way to sort the factually guilty from the innocent. The Fourth Amendment bans
general warrants because they manifest raw government power over our lives, because
they subordinate the citizen to the government, and because they permit wholesale
convictions for antigovernment conduct.
Id. at 175.
217. Thomas, supra note 211, at 161.
218. Id. at 203 (The point of the Fourteenth Amendment was to restrict the power of the
states to take away citizens' rights.).
219. Id. at 217 (This could be done by focusing on dicta in past decided cases that would not
require the Supreme Court to discontinue protecting stare decisis.).
220. Thomas, supra note 211, at 232.
221. See infra notes 225-350 and accompanying text.
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official's violation of some state arrest statute, including state extra-
territorial arrest statutes, does not concurrently give rise to a contem-
poraneous Fourth Amendment claim when probable cause exists, a
minority of federal judges believes police compliance with state arrest
law is integral in determining the Fourth Amendment "reasonable-
ness" of certain unlawful arrests.222 The United States Supreme Court
has never fully or precisely analyzed a case in which a state officer
effectuated an intrastate arrest outside of his or her jurisdiction in di-
rect and flagrant violation of a state law; however, the Court has con-
flictingly commented on whether a violation of some state laws could,
contemporaneously, violate an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights.223 Nevertheless, no bright-line rule of reasonableness exists
under the Fourth Amendment, and whether a search or seizure is un-
reasonable depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.224
1. In Certain Search and Seizure Circumstances, Federal Courts
Refuse to Consider State Statutory Compliance When
Determining Fourth Amendment Reasonableness
The Supreme Court has "never taken the position that an arrest
made on probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment merely be-
cause a taking of custody was deemed unnecessary (as a matter of
state law . . . .)"225 In Snowden v. Hughes,226 the Court held: "[A]
mere violation of state statute does not infringe the Federal Constitu-
tion. ' '227 Moreover, in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halder-
222. Id.
223. See generally Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59-61 (1967); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 33-36 (1963).
224. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (cited in Aaron H. Mendelsohn, Supreme Court
Review: The Fourth Amendment and Traffic Stops: Bright Line Rules in Conjunction with the
Totality of the Circumstances Test, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 930 (1998)); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964) (The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the use of
bright-line rules in Fourth Amendment analysis, "instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of
the reasonableness inquiry.").
225. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 192, at 141. See also People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 66 n.4 (Cal.
2002).
226. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
227. Id. at 11. However, Snowden was not a criminal case under the Fourth Amendment.
Snowden involved a claim for equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2. The
plaintiff complained he was denied equal protection when the State of Illinois denied him access
to the primary election for representatives of the General Assembly. Id. at 3. The plaintiff
claimed that members of the State Primary Canvassing Board of Illinois, through state action,
refused to nominate the petitioner for the republican candidate for the state position, even
though the plaintiff received the highest number of votes, and that state action denied the plain-
tiff equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 3-4. The
United States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he protection extended to citizens of the United
States by the privileges and immunities clause includes those rights and privileges which, under
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man,228 the Court, over strong dissent from Justices William J.
Brennan and John Paul Stevens, declared: "[it is difficult to think of a
greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court in-
structs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.
Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism
.... 229 In Elkins v. United States,2 30 the Court examined whether
evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure by state
police officers, with no federal involvement, may be introduced into
evidence in federal court.2 31 The Court answered in the negative, as-
serting that evidence obtained by state officers during a search, which
would have been illegal if conducted by federal officers, violates a de-
fendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 232 In Cooper v. California,233 the Court held
that a search of a vehicle, a week after legal impoundment that con-
formed to state narcotics law, was not unreasonable under the Fourth
the laws and Constitution of the United States, are incident to citizenship of the United States,
•.. not... [those] rights pertaining to state citizenship and derived solely from the relationship
of the citizen and his state established state law." Id. at 6. There was no contention that the
state statute governing the voting and nominating processes for state government was inconsis-
tent with the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Snowden, 321 U.S. at 7. There was no show-
ing that the nomination board "intentional[ly] or purposeful[ly]" discriminated between persons
or classes." Id. at 7. Purposeful or intentional discrimination is what the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits, not the board's action of deviating from state law governing the nomination
procedure and "[a] construction of the equal protection clause which would find a violation of
federal right in every departure by state officers from state law is not to be favored." Id. at 11-
12. It must be remembered, however, that this case concerned the honor of nomination for
public office, not a denial of Fourth Amendment rights in a criminal prosecution.
228. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
229. Id. at 106. It concluded that the doctrines from Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (a
suit challenging the federal constitutionally of a state official's action is not one against the state
within the Eleventh Amendment) and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (refusing to ex-
tend Young and recognizing the need to promote the supremacy of federal law that is the basis in
Young must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the states) are inapplicable to a
claim against state officials for a violation of state law. Id. at 106. The Court again focused on
the lack of "willful or even negligent" conduct by the state officials. Id. at 107. However, Pen-
nhurst was an Eleventh Amendment class action claim brought by mentally retarded citizens for
a violation of their statutory rights based on the condition of the mental hospital in which they
stayed. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 103-04.
230. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
231. Id. at 208. This is also called the "silver platter doctrine." Id.
232. The Court in Elkins, concerning an illegal search, announced, "In determining whether
there has been an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers, a federal court must make
an independent inquiry, whether or not there has been such an inquiry by a state court, and
irrespective of how any such inquiry may have turned out. The test is one of federal law, neither
enlarged by what one state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may
have colorably suppressed." Id. at 223-24.
233. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
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Amendment. 34 In deciding the issue, the Court noted, "[T]he ques-
tion ... [was] not whether the search was authorized by state law...
rather whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment. '2 35 Finally, in California v. Greenwood,236 the Court declared it
has
[n]ever intimated .. .that whether or not a search is reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends on the law
of the particular State in which the search occurs. [The Court has]
emphasized instead that the Fourth Amendment analysis must turn
on such factors as "our societal understanding that certain areas de-
serve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion."237
Following this line of Supreme Court decisions, some federal cir-
cuits hold that police compliance with state arrest laws serves no pur-
pose in Fourth Amendment claims of unreasonable police conduct.238
234. Id. at 62. However, the statute in question authorized the state to impound a vehicle
after that vehicle was found to contain narcotics. Id. The issue was not whether the police acted
in direct violation of a state statute, but rather, whether they should be allowed to search at all.
Id. at 61.
235. Id. The Court stated: "Just as a search authorized by state law may be an unreasonable
one under... [the Fourth] amendment, so may a search not expressly unauthorized by state law
be justified as a constitutionally reasonable one." Id.
236. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
237. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). The defendants argued that their expectation of privacy in
putting the garbage out to be picked up was reasonable under the Constitution because the
warrantless search and seizure of his garbage was unlawful under California law. Id.
238. See United States v. Santa, 180 F.3d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1999) (evidence admitted even though
an arrest warrant was vacated because the police acted with an objective belief that the arrest
warrant was still valid); Vargas-Badillo v. Diaz-Torres, 114 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Mere viola-
tions of state law do not ... create constitutional claims."); United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429
(6th Cir. 1994) (no Fourth Amendment violation because federal law controls arrest procedure
in federal court based on federal charges and officers had probable cause for making the arrest
based upon the convicted informant's reliable information); Gordon v. Degelmann, 29 F.3d 295,
301 (7th Cir. 1994) (a violation of a state procedural statute providing a hearing on ownership of
a residence under the Illinois forcible entry and detainer statute is not necessarily a violation of
the federal constitution); United States v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 1992) (When deter-
mining whether a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, courts should ex-
amine federal law, not state law. All that is required under federal law is probable cause when
effectuating a warrantless arrest.); Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 371 (4th Cir. 1974) ("There is
no constitutional prohibition against arrests for investigation where probable cause exists.")
(quoting Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1964) (internal citations omitted). See also
United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir. 1998). The court in Van Metre stated:
[T]he general rule.., is that evidence admissible under federal law cannot be excluded
because it would be inadmissible under state law. The federal inquiry has not turned
on whether a state officer violated state law in securing probative evidence. Rather,
the proper standard for evaluating illegal . . . seizure claims in federal courts has uni-
formly been whether the actions of the state officials in securing the evidence violated
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id. See also United States v. Bell, 54 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir. 1995). The court in Bell stated:
States may impose rules for arrests, searches, and seizures that are more restrictive than
the Federal Constitution ... [Therefore] state law violations do not necessarily offend
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For example, in United States v. Le,2 39 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit held: "The fact that [an] arrest, search, or
seizure may have violated state law is irrelevant as long as the stan-
dards developed under the Federal Constitution were not of-
fended. '2 40 However, the court continued, stating that compliance
with state warrant procedure is only part of the totality of the circum-
stances that a federal court should consider when determining warrant
sufficiency.241 Moreover, in United States v. Wright,242 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit added to the Le holding,
stating, "[T]his [holding]243 promotes uniformity in federal prosecu-
tions. Indeed, it would be strange for the results of federal prosecu-
tions to depend on the fortuity of the defendants being arrested in one
state or another. '2 44
When analyzing extra-jurisdictional arrest, these same federal
courts rely on "federalism" to dispose of constitution violation claims.
More importantly, in many cases, the issue is disposed of in one sen-
tence: "The federal government is not the enforcer of state law. '245
This reasoning is a source of concern because Fourth Amendment
probable cause is now synonymous with reasonableness. 246
2. In Other Circumstances, Federal and State Courts Examine
Police Compliance with State Statutes When Determining
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness
A federal court that declares that state statutory compliance serves
no place in determining the constitutional "reasonableness" of some
the Federal Constitution. . . .When a federal court must decide whether to exclude
evidence obtained through an arrest, search, or seizure by state officers, the appropri-
ate inquiry is whether the arrest, search, or seizure violated the Federal Constitution,
not whether the arrest, search, or seizure violated state law.
Id. at 503-04.
239. 173 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 1999).
240. Id. at 1265. However, Le involved violations of state law sufficiency of a warrant requir-
ing more specificity than what the Fourth Amendment required. Id. Oklahoma law required an
affidavit for an arrest warrant to include the specific dates illegal activity was observed taking
place on the premises where the warrant was to be served. Id.
241. Id. at 1265.
242. 16 F.3d 1429 (6th Cir. 1994).
243. The holding stated that arrest, search, or seizure statutory compliance is irrelevant to
standards developed under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1437.
244. Id.
245. Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Pres. Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2001). See also
Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1048 (7th Cir. 1995); Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994,
998 (8th Cir. 1994) (majority); Cole v. Neb. State Bd. of Parole, 997 F.2d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 1993);
Archie v. City of Ravine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988); McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d
1183, 1187 (7th Cir. 1984).
246. People v. McKay, 41 P.3d. 59, 83-84 (Cal. 2002).
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state action is mistaken, as evidenced by some courts' examination of
state law compliance. In Wolf v. Colorado,247 the Supreme Court de-
termined that the federal constitution, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state of-
ficers because the rights of privacy against arbitrary police intrusion
are implicit within "the concept of ordered liberty" and enforceable
against the states through incorporation into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.248 In Mapp v. Ohio,249 the Court decided that the reasonable-
ness standard of the Fourth Amendment should apply to states with
the same degree of enforceability under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.250 However, the Court minimized the reach of its holding, de-
claring that federal courts are not to assume a supervisory role over
state courts251 and that there is no "obliteration of state laws relating
to arrests and searches in favor of federal law. ' 252 Moreover, in a
federal prosecution, "the test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by
what one state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by what
another may have colorably suppressed. ' 253 In Mapp, the Court gen-
247. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
248. Id. at 27-28. The exclusionary rule did not apply to the states until Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
249. 367 U.S. 643. In Mapp, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment when an officer violates a defendant's constitutional
rights when effectuating a search for evidence. Id. at 660. The Court stated:
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment
is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions
of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer per-
mit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same man-
ner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can
no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name
of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on
reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guar-
antees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is
entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration
of justice.
Id.
250. Id. at 655.
251. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963) ("[Tjhe lawlessness of arrests for federal of-
fenses is to be determined by reference to state law insofar as it is not violative of the Federal
Constitution. A fortiori, the lawfulness of these arrests by state officers for state offenses is to be
determined by [state] law."). Id. at 37.
252. Id. at 31 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court stated:
A healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state
and federal courts by itself urging that federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime
under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now
mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches.
Id. See also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658.
253. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 224.
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erally decided that, although a search or seizure may violate a state
law, states are free to make laws that are more restrictive than what
the Fourth Amendment provides all individuals.2 54 If the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause requirement for making an arrest and
the reasonableness of the search or arrest are both satisfied, 255 a fed-
eral claim of a violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment constitu-
tional rights does not exist when a state law is accordingly violated.25 6
However, the Court never determined the "unreasonableness" of
these state statutory violations, raising the following problem:
[W]hether or not the Fourth Amendment is [a] basis of exclusion,
and even when it is reasonably apparent that exclusion has resulted
from failure to comply with a state or court rule there will often
remain the uncertainty of whether the rule or statute itself states a
constitutional requirement so that ... the violation may be said to
be of constitutional dimension.2 57
254. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658-60.
255. The Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures is the very
essence of an individual's constitutional liberty and is "as important and as imperative as are the
guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen." Ker, 374 U.S. at 32. The
standards of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not restricted when carried into
the realm of state law through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 33. However,
[Allthough the standard of reasonableness is the same under the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments, the demands of our federal system compel us to distinguish be-
tween evidence held inadmissible because of [the Supreme Court's] supervisory powers
over federal courts and that held inadmissible because prohibited by the United States
Constitution .... [R]easonableness of a search in the first instance [is] a substantive
determination to be made by the trial court from the facts and circumstances of the
case and in the light of the 'fundamental criteria' laid down by the Fourth Amendment
and in the opinions of [the Supreme Court] applying that Amendment. Findings of
reasonableness ... are respected only insofar as consistent with federal constitutional
guarantees.... The states are not ... precluded from developing workable rules gov-
erning arrests, searches and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of effective crimi-
nal investigation and law enforcement' in the States, provided that those rules do not
violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the
concomitant command that evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has
standing to complain.
Id. at 33-34.
256. The defendants in Ker argued that, even though the officers had probable cause to make
the arrest, the officers violated statutory authority and therefore, the arrest was invalid and the
fruits of the arrest should be excluded. Id. at 37. The Court announced that "the lawfulness of
arrests for federal offenses is to be determined by reference to state law insofar as it is not
violative of the Federal Constitution." Id. (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)). The Court examined whether the method of
home entry, although violative of the state law, offended federal constitutional standards of rea-
sonableness. Id. at 37-38. It held the method of entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment's
reasonable standard. Id. at 38. The Court stated that the exigent circumstances of destroying
evidence provided the officers with a reason to enter the house furtively and that exigent circum-
stances were an exception to the California state law that officers must demand admission and
announce their purpose of being there before entering the dwelling. Id. at 39-40.
257. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 192, at 129.
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a. Probable Cause is not Synonymous with "Reasonableness"
At the outset, even if a police officer has probable cause to make an
arrest or to search for evidence, the Supreme Court itself determined
that some searches and seizures require more than just probable
cause.25 8 In Winston v. Lee,25 9 the Court held that an unauthorized
surgical procedure to remove a bullet for evidence, even when based
on probable cause, was "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amend-
ment.260 In Winston, the defendant allegedly robbed a shop and was
shot in the left shoulder by the shopkeeper. 261 Blocks later, the police
came across a man with a gunshot wound in his left shoulder and took
him to the hospital. 262 The shopkeeper subsequently identified the
man as the armed robber.263 The police then had probable cause to
believe the defendant was the armed robber, but they wanted the bul-
let for ballistics testing. 264 Although the victim's identification of the
defendant satisfied probable cause, the Court decided that the lack of
exigent circumstances and the availability of other evidence overrode
the probable cause basis for the surgical search and seizure of the bul-
let.265 The Court declared, "Notwithstanding the existence of proba-
ble cause, a search for evidence of a crime may be unjustifiable if it
endangers the life or health of the suspect. '266 Although Winston was
about unauthorized bodily intrusion, the case demonstrates that prob-
able cause does not automatically make a search or seizure "reasona-
ble." Even with existing probable cause, in some situations, state or
police action may still be constitutionally unreasonable.
Along with illustrating that the existence of probable cause does not
always equal "reasonableness," compliance with state law, in certain
instances, is necessary for certain state actions to be "reasonable."
These situations include the following: (1) inventory searches; (2) ad-
ministrative inspections of housing and private commercial property;
(3) search incident to arrest; and (4) warrantless home entry to facili-
258. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). Cf Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(holding that a state may, over a suspect's protest to a DUI, have a physician extract blood from
the person without violating the suspect's right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and
seizures, because of the existence of exigent circumstances).
259. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).





265. Winston, 470 U.S. at 760.
266. Id. at 761.
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tate an arrest.267 The reasoning in these situations is applicable to un-
authorized extra-jurisdictional arrests.
i. Inventory proceedings
Police inventory proceedings during booking must conform to "es-
tablished inventory procedures. ' 268 In Illinois v. Lafayette,269 the Su-
preme Court rejected an arrested defendant's argument that a
warrantless search of her handbag during the booking process was un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 270 The Court would not
"second-guess police departments as to what practical administrative
method will best deter theft by and false claims against its employees
and preserve the security of the station house. ' 271 Based on the
Court's opinion, state procedure governs the Fourth Amendment
"reasonableness" of any inventory proceeding and police must follow
proper governmental administration pursuant to "standardized proce-
dures" or "reasonable legislative or administrative standards. 272 If
state administrative statutes regulate how these searches and inspec-
tions are to be conducted, then compliance is necessary when deter-
mining if an inventory proceeding is "reasonable."
ii. Administrative searches
Courts examine state statutory compliance when determining the
"reasonableness" of an administrative search. Like inventory pro-
ceedings during booking, an administrative search must also conform
to "standardized procedures" or "reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards. ' 273 In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,274 the Supreme Court
determined that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
was unconstitutional when it allowed agents to search a work area of
any employment facility for safety hazards and violations without a
warrant or its equivalent. 275 In Barlow's, Inc., OSHA allowed Secre-
tary of Labor agents to search any employment facility within their
jurisdiction without a search warrant. 276 The Secretary of Labor ar-
gued that warrantless inspections to enforce OSHA are reasonable
267. See infra notes 268-355 and accompanying text.
268. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983).
269. Id. at 640.
270. Id. at 641.
271. Id. at 648.
272. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 192, at 140.
273. Id.
274. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
275. Id. at 325.
276. Id. at 309.
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under the Fourth Amendment, 277 but the Court balanced the compet-
ing Fourth Amendment interests and disagreed. 278
Moreover, in New York v. Burger,279 the Court extended the war-
rant requirement in Barlow's, Inc., holding that when a state statute
authorizes an administrative search, a warrant is not required, and the
search will be reasonable.280 In Burger, the defendant owned a vehi-
cle dismantling shop.281 A New York statute authorized state admin-
istration officials or police officers to inspect, on a regular basis and
without a warrant, any vehicle dismantling business.282 The defendant
was charged for certain crimes arising out of the warrantless police
administrative inspection authorized by the statute. 283 The Court de-
termined that the state statute provided "a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant. '284 As a result of these two cases, an admin-
istrative search requires either a warrant or an authorizing state stat-
ute.2 85 If a warrant is not obtained, then compliance with state
statutes must be considered in order for the administrative search to
be constitutionally "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.286
Therefore, sitting courts do consider compliance with state regulations
in deciding the "reasonableness" of warrantless administrative
searches.
iii. Searches incident to arrest
State statutory construction and compliance is important when de-
ciding the "reasonableness" of a search incident to arrest. As Wayne
LaFave explains, a search incident to arrest can be examined as a
"standardized procedure" rather than a Fourth Amendment probable
cause issue.287 In Knowles v. Iowa,288 the Supreme Court held that a
search incident to an arrest, in which a state statute did not authorize
the arrest, violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 289 In
277. Id. at 311.
278. See generally Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-25 (1978).
279. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
280. Id. at 711.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 694-95.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 711.
285. See, e.g., Jennifer Buffaloe, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception
Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 535 (1997).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 235 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), in which the Supreme
Court held that a person may be searched incident to his arrest without regard to the probability
that he is carrying weapons or contraband).
288. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
289. Id. at 118-19.
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Knowles, an officer stopped the defendant for speeding and issued a
citation rather than arresting him.290 A state statute authorized an
officer to make an arrest or, in lieu of arrest, to issue a citation for a
traffic offense. 291 If an officer elects to issue a citation, the officer may
still conduct a search of an automobile.292 The Court decided that,
regardless of the authorizing statute, if an officer decides to issue a
citation in lieu of an arrest, he or she may not subsequently conduct a
valid search incident to the arrest because no arrest occurred.293
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,294 a defendant was arrested for a
minor seatbelt traffic violation. State law authorized a warrantless ar-
rest for a seatbelt violation.2 95 The defendant argued that the arrest
for such a minor traffic offense violated her Fourth Amendment
rights.2 96 The Court disagreed, noting that the officer had probable
cause to arrest the defendant and that the state granted its officers
statutory arrest authority for this particular offense. 297
In United States v. Mota,2 9 8 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held: "[I]t is clear that state law governing arrests is
relevant to assessing the constitutionality of a search incident to that
arrest. 12 99 In Mota, the defendant was arrested after officers found
him operating a corn cart without a valid business license. 3°° Upon a
search incident to arrest, the officers discovered forty-one counterfeit
bills. 301 The defendant motioned to suppress the counterfeit bills ar-
guing that the officers lacked authority under California law to arrest
the defendant for a mere criminal infraction; therefore, the search,
which uncovered the counterfeit bills, was unconstitutional. 3 2 The
Ninth Circuit announced that the application of the exclusionary rule
in federal court does not turn on compliance with state law and should
focus on conformity with federal law.30 3 However, "this does not nec-
290. Id. at 114.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 115.
293. Id. at 117-19.
294. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
295. Id. at 324.
296. Id. at 325.
297. Id. at 354.
298. 982 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1993).
299. Id. at 1387.
300. Id. at 1385.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1385-86.
303. Id. at 1387.
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essarily mean ... that state law will always be irrelevant in assessing the
legality of a seizure as a matter of federal law. '30 4
iv. Warrantless home entry to execute an arrest
Finally, courts consider state statutes when determining the "rea-
sonableness" of a warrantless home entry to effectuate an arrest. In
Welsh v. Wisconsin,30 5 the Supreme Court examined the Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" of a warrantless home arrest by bal-
ancing the legitimate governmental interest in an arrest against the
degree of intrusiveness in an individual's privacy and personal free-
dom. In Welsh, the defendant was suspected of driving under the in-
fluence (DUI), a nonjailable offense in that state.30 6 Police officers,
armed with probable cause, initiated a warrantless nighttime home en-
try to arrest the defendant.30 7 The Court examined the Wisconsin
state law classification of DUI in considering the "reasonableness" of
the warrantless home arrest. 30 8 The Court found that a nighttime war-
rantless home entry to arrest a DUI suspect, classified as a civil traffic
offense in Wisconsin, violated the Fourth Amendment, even when
probable cause and exigent circumstances existed.309 In this decision,
the Court adopted a common sense approach to Fourth Amendment
reasonableness when dealing with arrests and exigent
circumstances. 310
However, a comparison of Welsh v. Wisconsin to Stark v. New York
State Deptartment of Motor Vehicles311 is necessary to appreciate the
importance of state law when determining the constitutional "reason-
ableness" of police action. In Stark, police officers observed a defen-
dant driving erratically and concluded that he was driving under the
influence of alcohol. 312 The officers followed the automobile to the
defendant's home and watched him pull into his garage and shut the
304. Mota, 982 F.2d at 1387 (emphasis added). The court used inventory searches as an exam-
ple. Id. It stated that, under federal law, inventory searches "must be conducted in accordance
with the official procedures of the relevant state or local police department." Id. (quoting United
States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
305. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
306. Id. at 746.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 750 ("When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that
presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be
allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and
detached magistrate."). See also United States v. Lewis, 183 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 1999).
309. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754.
310. Id. at 753.
311. 483 N.Y.S.2d 824 (App. Div. 1984).
312. Id. at 825.
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door. 313 The defendant's wife permitted the officers inside the home
without a warrant. 314 The officers found the defendant lying in bed
and stinking of alcohol.315 The defendant refused an alcohol
breathalyzer test and was arrested for DUI.316 The defendant argued,
citing Welsh, that the arrest was invalid because a warrantless home
arrest for DUI violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.31 7 A New York appellate court
disagreed, holding that the officer's conduct was "reasonable" because
probable cause and exigent circumstances existed and because New
York law made first offense DUI a misdemeanor punishable by less
than one year in prison.318 Citing Welsh, the court determined that
"the penalty imposed by a State for a particular offense was 'the best
indication of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest." 319 The
court compared the punishment for first offense DUI in New York to
the punishment for first offense DUI in Wisconsin. Based on this
comparison, the court held that, with probable cause and exigent cir-
cumstances, the arrest was valid because New York's classification of
DUI was more stringent than Wisconsin's classification of DUI.320 By
allowing a punishment of less than one year in prison for first time
DUI offenses, the New York Legislature demonstrated a dedication to
curbing DUI offenses. 321
v. Other situations in which state statute is examined
Other Supreme Court cases suggest that complying with state law is
important in certain determinations of Fourth Amendment "reasona-
bleness." In Michigan v. DeFillippo,322 the Supreme Court stated:
"Whether an officer is authorized to make an arrest [will] ordinarily
depend[] in the first instance, on state law."'323 Moreover, in United





317. Stark, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 825.




322. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
323. Id. at 36 (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963)); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 15 n.5 (1948)). Some courts, albeit in obiter dictum itself, hold this statement as mere
dicta because the defendant did not contend that his arrest was unauthorized by state law. See
People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 67-68 (Cal. 2002).
324. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
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held that "in absence of an applicable federal statute the law of the
state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its valid-
ity. ' '325 The Court continued, "[t]here is no reason to believe that
state law is not an equally appropriate standard by which to test ar-
rests without [a] warrant, except in those cases where Congress has
enacted a federal rule. '326 Furthermore, in Ker v. California,327 a plu-
rality of the Court held that although an officer's entry into a house
when effectuating an arrest violated a state law, under the circum-
stances, the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses.328 However, the Court stated:
[T]he lawfulness of arrests for federal offenses is to be determined
by reference to state law insofar as it is not violative of the Federal
Constitution. A fortiori, the lawfulness of these arrests by state of-
ficers for state offenses is to be determined by California [state]
law.3 29
325. Id. at 589-90.
326. Id. (emphasis added). Di Re involved a defendant who was arrested for the misde-
meanor of knowingly possessing counterfeit gasoline rationing coupons. Id. A New York State
officer was accompanied by federal officers, who received a tip from an informer that the defen-
dant was carrying counterfeit gasoline rationing coupons, and they acted on that tip following
the defendant. Id. at 582. When the defendant stopped, the state police officer went up to the
car and saw the informer in the back seat with some coupons in his lap. Id. The informer said he
got them from the driver, who sat next to the defendant. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 582. The state
officer frisked the defendant for weapons and then arrested, without a warrant, all three men.
Id. At the jail, the officers found over one hundred coupons on the defendant. Id. at 583. There
was no federal statute controlling the warrantless arrest by an officer. Id. at 591. The Court
looked back to common law and discussed the notions of when an officer can make a warrantless
arrest for a misdemeanor and when an officer can make a warrantless arrest for a felony. Id.
Here, the defendant was arrested for a misdemeanor, which had not occurred in the presence of
the arresting officer. Id. Therefore, the Court held the warrantless arrest by the officer illegal
and suppressed the fruits of that unlawful arrest. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 592-93.
However, some courts, albeit in obiter dictum itself, and commentators argue, perhaps rightly
so, that Di Re was not based on a constitutional compulsion but was a case of statutory construc-
tion. See People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 67 (Cal. 2002) (Therefore, it fell directly within the
Supreme Court's supervisory power on the issue of the choice of law by which to measure the
validity of arrests in federal prosecutions.). See also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 192, at 138; 2 WIL-
LIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS 23-71 (2d ed. 1979).
327. 374 U.S. 23, 33-36 (1963). In Ker, a California state law permitted officers to break into a
dwelling place for the purpose of arrest after demanding admittance and explaining their pur-
pose for being there. Id. The officers in Ker violated the state law by obtaining a pass key from
the apartment super, unlocking the defendant's apartment door, opening the door quietly, pro-
ceeding quietly into the defendant's living room and subsequently identifying themselves and
providing the reason for being there. Id. The district court held, with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirming, that there was probable cause for the arrest and that
the entry into the residence was for the purpose of making an arrest and was not unlawful. Id.
328. Id. at 40-41.
329. Id. at 37 (citations omitted). Some courts hold, albeit in obiter dictum, that this statement
too was merely dicta because the police in Ker had complied with California's state arrest law.
See People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 67 (Cal. 2002).
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Some judges argue that this line of Supreme Court decisions sup-
ports the notion that certain state arrest statutory violations can con-
temporaneously violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. For
example, in United States v. Lewis,330 a concurring judge argued,
"[s]ince we are dealing with an arrest by Minneapolis police officers
for a violation of a Minneapolis ordinance, the federal court should
not sanction an explicit violation of the governing laws as defined by
the legislature and courts of the State of Minnesota. ' 331 Moreover,
the concurring opinion found that the Supreme Court has suggested,
"state law should play an ancillary role (to federal constitutional law)
in assessing whether an officer has made a lawful custodial arrest. ' 332
In Lewis, an officer arrested the defendant after witnessing the defen-
dant holding an open container of liquor in public, a misdemeanor in
Minnesota. 333 The officer conducted a search incident to arrest and
found drugs on the defendant's person. 334 The defendant argued that
the officer was not authorized by Minnesota law to arrest the defen-
dant for only a misdemeanor in this situation, and therefore the evi-
dence seized should be suppressed. 335 The majority relied on stare
decisis,336 determining that the inquiry was not whether the arrest was
valid under state criminal procedure, but whether the arrest was valid
under federal law. 337
In United States v. Bradley,338 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit examined state law and determined that a con-
sented search of a defendant's home was tainted after he was unlaw-
fully arrested in violation of state arrest law.339 The court scrutinized
330. 183 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1999).
331. Id. at 795 (Heaney, J., concurring) (citing State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn.
1998)).
332. Id. at 796 (Heaney, J., concurring) (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979)).
333. Id. at 792.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 793. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.01 allows for custodial arrests for
misdemeanors only when it reasonably appears that arrest is necessary to avoid bodily harm to
the defendant, another person, when there could be a furtherance of criminal conduct, or when
there is a substantial likelihood that the accused will fail to respond to a citation. Lewis, 183 F.3d
at 793 n.5. In this situation, the defendant argued that the officer should have issued a citation
and was not authorized to arrest because no circumstances described in the state ordinance were
present. Id.
336. Id. at 793-94 (citing United States v. Bell, 54 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1995)).
337. Id. at 794.
338. 922 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1991).
339. Id. at 1296. In Bradley, the defendant was indicted by a grand jury for possession of
narcotics. Id. at 1291. Tennessee state law requires all home arrests to be effectuated per a valid
arrest warrant, not a copy of the indictment establishing probable cause to arrest. Id. at 1293.
Officers went to the defendant's residence and effectuated an arrest without an arrest warrant
only relying on the indictment in direct violation of Tennessee law. Id. at 1295. The officers
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Tennessee state criminal procedure, the totality of the circumstances
in the case, and the flagrancy of the officers' conduct and held that
drug evidence seized from a contemporaneous search of the defen-
dant's home should be suppressed. 340 In United States v. Richard-
son,341 the Tenth Circuit enunciated that federal courts are to
"conduct an independent inquiry... apply[ing] federal law... [into]
the reasonableness of a state search," but that federal courts "are not
prohibited from considering state law, although such consideration
may not enlarge nor diminish federal law. '342
b. State Law Compliance is Relevant to Constitutional
Reasonableness
Based on the above reasoning, state law compliance in many cir-
cumstances directly determines the constitutional reasonableness of
police action. As seen from comparing Welsh to Stark, state classifica-
tion of crimes certainly affects the constitutional reasonableness of po-
lice conduct. Moreover, state procedures for inventory proceedings
and administrative searches also determine the constitutional reasona-
bleness of police conduct. Finally, the state classification of arrest pro-
cedures directly determines whether a search incident to an arrest is
constitutionally reasonable. Therefore, the reasonableness of police
conduct, in some circumstances, will directly revolve around state law.
What is constitutionally reasonable in one state is not necessarily con-
stitutionally reasonable in another state. 343
When analyzing extra-jurisdictional arrest, to hold that an unlawful
extra-jurisdictional arrest is not constitutionally unreasonable is incon-
sistent with the above analysis when, in fact, state law can control the
constitutional reasonableness of some police action altogether.344 To
rely on "federalism" and to determine that constitutional reasonable-
ness does not depend on state law compliance is inaccurate. For this
reason, many majority opinions have been accompanied by strong
concurring 345 and dissenting opinions.346
obtained the defendant's consent to search the defendant's residence at the time of the arrest.
Their search procured contraband evidence. Id. at 1292.
340. Bradley, 922 F.2d at 1296.
341. 86 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1996).
342. Id. at 1544 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
343. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Stark v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 483 N.Y.S.2d 824 (App. Div. 1984).
344. See supra notes 247-343 and accompanying text.
345. These concurrences merely agree with the majority because of stare decisis, but implore
the court to reexamine its previous positions.
346. See supra notes 247-343 and accompanying text.
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For example, in Abbott v. City of Crocker,347 Judge Richard S. Ar-
nold argued that compliance with state arrest statutes is relevant in
determining whether the officer's conduct in question is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.348 He believed that a court must de-
termine whether the violated extra-jurisdictional arrest statute is de-
signed to protect individuals from police behavior that would
otherwise be unreasonable. 349 A violation of some state arrest law
may not be a per se violation of the federal constitution, but may be
unreasonable depending on the circumstances in each case.350 Dis-
senting in People v. McKay,35 1 California Supreme Court Justice
Brown argued that probable cause is not synonymous with reasonable
conduct. 352 Therefore, only by balancing the legitimate governmental
interests against the degree of intrusiveness upon an individual's pri-
vacy would the reasonableness of any unlawful arrest be resolved. 353
Finally, in Ross v. Neff,354 the majority believed that even if an officer
thought he or she could legally effectuate an extra-jurisdictional ar-
rest, his or her belief only lent itself to a qualified immunity defense
and not to the underlying unreasonableness of the officer's unlawful
extra-jurisdictional arrest.355
IV. IMPACT: COULD AN UNLAWFUL EXTRA-JURISDICTIONAL
ARREST BE AN UNREASONABLE SEIZURE UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT?
The Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant when effectuat-
ing an arrest in public, even if no exigent circumstances exist.35 6 Even
though a public arrest based on probable cause may be valid, some
arrests can still be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 357
There is a split between federal court majority and minority decisions
when deciding whether state statutory compliance should balance on
arrest reasonableness.3 5 8 In some situations, courts conclude that
compliance with state arrest laws directly affect the constitutional rea-
347. 30 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1994).
348. Id. at 999.
349. Id. at 1000.
350. Id.
351. 41 P.3d 59 (Cal. 2002).
352. Id. at 84 (Brown, J., dissenting).
353. Id.
354. 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1990).
355. Id. at 1354-55; see also Dunn v. City of Elgin, 347 F.3d 641, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2003).
356. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
357. See supra notes 247-350 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 225-350 and accompanying text.
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sonableness of an arrest. 359 In other cases, these same courts refuse to
examine state law compliance when determining the constitutional
reasonableness of arrest conduct.360 When deciding the "reasonable-
ness" of an unlawful extra-jurisdictional arrest, courts tend to follow
the later of these two, refusing to inquire into state law compliance.361
However, the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement
commands a balancing of the government's legitimate interests versus
an individual's interest in being free from unreasonable government
intrusions, personal liberty, and individual privacy. 362 This section will
attempt to illustrate how, in some circumstances, a flagrant violation
of an extra-jurisdictional arrest statute can contemporaneously be
constitutionally unreasonable. 363 This section will balance the com-
peting interests at issue-weighing the government's protection of so-
ciety versus individual freedom from unreasonable governmental
action and personal autonomy. 364
A. A Fourth Amendment Analysis of Unlawful
Extra-Jurisdictional Arrests
The Supreme Court has held that in any Fourth Amendment case:
[When] determining whether a particular governmental action vio-
lates [the Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether the action
was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common
law when the Amendment was framed. Where that inquiry yields
no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional
standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the de-
gree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests. 365
In deciding extra-jurisdictional arrest cases, not one federal court
majority inquired into whether a direct violation of police territorial
arrest jurisdiction was unlawful or unreasonable at common law.366
As evident from the history of police jurisdiction, common law and
the American history of arrest jurisprudence recognized police territo-
359. See supra notes 247-350 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 225-346 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 116-346 and accompanying text.
362. See generally Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
363. See infra notes 365-380 and accompanying text.
364. See infra notes 381-388 and accompanying text.
365. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) (citations omitted).
366. See supra Part llD. and accompanying notes.
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rial limitation.367 During the framers' era, society afforded law offi-
cials rights similar to those of their English counterparts. 368 Although
England moved into an age of official police enforcement at the time
of America's founding, American police officers remained separated
with official jurisdiction only over their respective towns.369 Even if
an archeological dig into police jurisdictional history does not reveal
the framers' true beliefs on police jurisdiction, courts must balance an
individual's privacy interests against the legitimate governmental
interests.
All states have ratified territorial statutes limiting law enforcement
capacity to circumscribed areas. 370 Additionally, states have codified
and recognized exceptions to territorial limitations with laws encom-
passing common law doctrines such as high pursuit and citizens' ar-
rest. 371 When a state police officer effectuates an extra-jurisdictional
arrest flagrantly against state law, and no common law or state statu-
tory exception applies, courts should inquire into the constitutional
reasonableness of this police action. State statutory compliance is al-
ready an important factor when determining the reasonableness of in-
ventory proceedings, administrative searches, search incident to
arrest, and the validly of a warrantless arrest based on exigent circum-
stances.372 Compliance with state extra-jurisdictional law should be a
relevant factor when considering the reasonableness of an officer's un-
lawful extra-jurisdictional arrest.
Courts determine whether an officer's conduct is "reasonable" by
asking whether "'a [person] of reasonable caution [would believe]'
that the action taken was appropriate, '373 in light of the particular
circumstances of each case, and based on the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the search or seizure.374 That reasonable
person, in extra-jurisdictional arrest cases, is a reasonable police of-
ficer. Yet, reasonable police officers should necessarily recognize the
367. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leet, 585 A.2d 1033, 1045 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("When the
sheriff's office was transplanted from England to the colonies, including Pennsylvania, its com-
mon law role as the primary peace officer of his bailiwick was not substantially altered.").
368. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 78-113 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 78-113 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 221-351 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 220-350 and accompanying text.
373. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) ("[S]imple 'good faith on the part of the arresting
officer is not enough.' . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the
Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses,




jurisdictional territory laws of their state and their respective
jurisdictions.
Moreover, even if an officer effectuates an unlawful, and, perhaps,
unreasonable-based on the reasonable person standard-extra-juris-
dictional arrest, courts have many statutory and common law excep-
tions to apply before finding a violation of a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.375 For example, in Pasiewicz, the defendant in-
vited the forest preserve officers to his place of employment.376
Therefore, even if the forest preserve officers acted unreasonably in
effectuating the defendant's arrest, the exception of consent should
apply. In Abbott, the police officer pursued the defendant over city
jurisdictional lines before making the arrest;377 however, before hold-
ing the police action unreasonable, the court could have disposed of
the issue by applying the doctrine of hot pursuit or by deciding
whether a valid citizen's arrest had occurred. For every unlawful ex-
tra-jurisdictional arrest, an exception could apply. For those situations
in which an exception does not apply, the Constitution mandates a
balancing of social and individual interests to determine whether po-
lice violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Relying on
"federalism" alone effectively disposes of the Fourth Amendment,
even if an officer could have acted in a constitutionally unreasonable
manner in a particular circumstance.
Even though many courts take an inflexible "federalist" approach
when deciding that a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights
for flagrant police violations of state arrest statutes are not contempo-
raneous violations of the Fourth Amendment,378 some constitutional
hope exists. A close reading of Pasiewicz and other cases reveals a
mitigating clause: "[C]ompliance with state law may well be relevant
in determining whether police conduct was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. ' 379 This clause indicates that courts are willing
to consider flagrant violations of state extra-jurisdictional arrest stat-
utes when considering the reasonableness of police conduct. 380 Yet no
375. See supra notes 78-113 and accompanying text.
376. Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Pres. Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 2001).
377. Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 1994).
378. See supra notes 117-168 and accompanying text.
379. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 527. See id. ("Such a blatant disregard of state law and the chain of
command could weigh on the scales of reasonableness."); Abbott, 30 F.3d at 998 ("[T]he ques-
tion of compliance with state law may well be relevant in determining whether police conduct
was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.").
380. The Seventh Circuit reconsidered its subjectively flawed reasoning in Pasiewicz in Dunn
v. City of Elgin, 347 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2003). In Dunn, two officers unilaterally enforced an out-
of-state custody order without court supervision. Id. at 644-45. The officers went to the plain-
tiff's door, knocked, and when she answered, took her child and gave the child to the waiting
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court has actually determined when such a consideration would be
appropriate.
B. Competing Fourth Amendment Interests Involved in
Extra-Jurisdictional Arrests
Judge Arnold, in Abbott,381 attempted to evaluate the competing
interests involved in extra-jurisdictional arrests by inquiring into the
nature of the state extra-jurisdictional arrest violation and the purpose
of the state law at issue. 382 He insisted:
"[T]he question of compliance with state law may well be relevant
in determining whether police conduct was reasonable for Fourth
Amendment purposes." . . . [E]ven though a violation of state law in
the context of an arrest is not a per se constitutional violation, it can
be "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, depending on the
nature of the violation. 383
In any extra-jurisdictional arrest, the government's main legitimate
interest is the need to protect society from criminal behavior in the
most effective and efficient manner. The government should protect
society to the best of its ability but should not cross the line that the
state legislature, the United States Constitution, and the common law
have explicitly drawn.
Police safety is one reason that legislatures regulate a police of-
ficer's official capacity to limited territories. When officers effectuate
extra-jurisdictional arrests, they immediately put themselves in dan-
ger. Officers acting outside their jurisdiction are less familiar with the
territory compared to their own locality. Officers may feel more anxi-
ety and stress because of the situation.384 Because of new surround-
ings, new people, and an increase in anxiety, a police officer's rational
cognitive and decision-making processes may become clouded and
convoluted. Police officers could begin to use more emotion in their
father. Id. The plaintiff sued and the court distinguished the case from Pasiewicz. Id. at 649.
The court found that the facts of the case made the officer's conduct objectively unreasonable
under the federal constitution:
It is not merely the violation of a state statute or the fact that the officers were acting
outside of their authority that motivates [the court's] conclusion in this case; it is also
the fact that in doing so the officers seized a child without probable cause or exigent
circumstances and gave the child to a third-party. All of these factors lead us to find
that in this case the officers were objectively unreasonable.
Id. at 650. However, at the end of the day, the court awarded qualified immunity to the defen-
dant officers. Id at 651.
381. 30 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1994).
382. Id. at 999.
383. Id. at 1000 (quoting United States v. Baker, 16 F.3d 854, 856 n.1 (8th Cir. 1999)).
384. This occurs more often in highly tense and potentially violent situations than it does in
standard arrests for minor crimes.
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decision-making processes. The ability to handle stressful arrest situa-
tions in a logical and peaceful manner is one effective tool officers
utilize for their own protection and the protection of others during the
arrest procedure.
With an increase in anxiety and a decrease in the ability to make
clear, unemotional, and unfettered decisions, comes a direct decrease
in society's safety as well. Society, unquestionably, is in further dan-
ger when police officers are not familiar with their territory, the peo-
ple they must deal with on a daily basis, or the general atmosphere of
their surroundings. Officers in unfamiliar territory, involved in high-
tension situations, may make inaccurate and unwise decisions. This
can turn a normal arrest situation into a dangerous one for citizens.
Common citizens may be unresponsive to unfamiliar police officers.
Moreover, with the lack of experience in a particular area, police of-
ficers may make some irrational decisions that could place innocent
people, the arrestee, and themselves in danger of bodily injury or even
death.
Another reason that legislatures regulate a police officer's official
capacity to limited territories is to reduce the risk of danger to the
arrestee. Police officers, thinking with high emotion and an impaired
sense of judgment, may cause arrestees to act unreasonably. Ar-
restees who are unfamiliar with police officers from different jurisdic-
tions may make irrational decisions when presented with an intense
arrest situation or may try to escape because they do not understand
what is happening. Arrestees may not believe that the individual try-
ing to arrest them is an actual police officer.385 If arrestees are unwill-
ing to be arrested or unfamiliar with their arrestor, the danger level
for police brutality or injury to the arrestee increases.
Furthermore, by limiting territorial jurisdiction, legislatures recog-
nize the need to preserve evidence seized. Police officers effectuating
385. Lateef Mungin, Rash of Fake Cops on 'Patrol', ATLANTA J.-CONsT., Feb. 21, 2004, at 2E
(discussing police imposters in Atlanta's metro area); Eric Hanson, Woman Driver Is Assaulted;
Attackers Pose As Police Officers, Hous. CHRON., July 27, 2002, at A37 (discussing the sexual
assault of a woman by two police imposters). See also Police Probe Traffic Stop by Man Dressed
As Officer, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 20, 2002, at B2; Ex-Official Accused of Impersonating
Officer, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 12, 2001, at A34; James Thorner, Deputy Impostors Pull Over Mo-
torist in Wesley Chapel, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 11, 1999, at 3; Nicole Sterghos, Dressing
the Part May Land Man 30 Years in Prison; Police Impersonator Faces Repeat-Offender Designa-
tion, SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE, FL), June 24, 1998, at B1; Charlene Hager-Van Dyke,
Pizzeria Manager Scammed by Caller Pretending To Be Cop; He Called the Eatery to Inform
Workers of a Bomb Threat. The Bomb Wasn't Real, But the Robbery That Followed Was, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Jan. 7, 1997, at D1; Brad Goldstein, Bogus Cop's Cop Leaves Officers
Searching in Dark, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 8, 1996, at B1; James Dao, Pataki Curbs Un-
marked Cars' Use, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996, at B5.
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an arrest in their respective jurisdictions are more familiar with the
collection process of critical evidence. This, in turn, leads to more
convictions and a more secure society. Police officers know how to
collect evidence for the most frequently committed crimes occurring
in their jurisdictions. Officers know where to look for critical evi-
dence because of territorial familiarity, the crimes that are committed
therein, and the jurisdiction's criminal inhabitants. When officers ar-
rest outside of their territory, what might be a routine arrest within
their own territory could turn into an acquittal based on the exclusion
of improperly collected evidence.
Finally, a significant, and perhaps the most important, reason that a
legislature limits the jurisdiction of police officers is that "smaller
communities are unlikely to have the resources to provide their of-
ficers with proper training in the elements of probable cause or arrest
procedures. '386 Officers patrolling small rural towns will have differ-
ent experiences, training, and preparation than narcotics enforcement
officers in large, populous cities. Conversely, a large city police of-
ficer, assigned to patrol violent neighborhoods could, perhaps, use too
much force when effectuating an unauthorized rural arrest. Although
interested in protecting society from criminal behavior, the govern-
ment is also interested in protecting society from extreme, violent, and
unbridled police behavior.387 By limiting the territory in which police
officers can act within their official capacity, legislatures guarantee so-
ciety "that officer[s] will be sufficiently trained for the types of arrests
[most] likely to occur in [their] community. ' 388
386. Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 1000 (8th Cir. 1994).
387. An extreme example occurred in Tennessee when a family, along with its two dogs, was
returning to South Carolina after visiting relatives. After filling their car with gas, one family
member accidentally left his wallet on top of the car. As the family left the gas station, the wallet
fell off the car. Witnesses believed there was a carjacking and called police. Police pursued the
family on the highway and, subsequently, pulled them over. The driver reached for his wallet.
One family member stated: "'So I'm expecting the officer to come to my window, but a blaring
light comes on and he starts blaring orders over a P.A. system for all the passengers in the car to
get out with their hands in the air."' The family complied, were handcuffed, and then put in the
back of the squad car. As this occurred, the family realized their two dogs were inside the car
and asked the police officers to shut the car doors so the dogs would not escape. The officer's
ignored their requests and one dog escaped. The dog began wagging its tail and approaching the
officer in a non-aggressive manner. The officer reached for a shotgun and unloaded his shotgun
in the dog's face while the family pleaded that the dog was friendly and would not hurt the
officer. The officer stated in his report, "'I yelled at the dog to get back, but it attempted to
circle me to attack, so I felt that I had no option but to protect myself."' The officer never
apologized to the family for his actions. See Family Says Police Killed Their Dog for No Reason
(Jan. 8, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003lUSlSouth/01/08/shot.dog/index.htmi (last visited Apr.
20, 2004); Video Shows Police Killing Dog (2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003JUS/01/09/po-
lice.kill.dog/index.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
388. Abbott, 30 F.3d at 1000.
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V. CONCLUSION
Effective law enforcement would not be seriously impaired by re-
quiring police officers to follow their respective state jurisdictional
statutes. Allowing defendants, at a maximum, to enforce their federal
constitutional right to be free from "unreasonable" police conduct
would place the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, back to its protectionist position. In
many situations, however, when an officer must effectuate an extra-
jurisdictional arrest, the exceptions of hot pursuit, citizens' arrest, con-
sent, exigent circumstances, and qualified immunity will likely apply.
Hot pursuit and the existence of exigent circumstances would likely
cause an officer's conduct, in direct violation of state jurisdictional
statute, to be reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Moreover, citizens' arrest is a catch-all safe harbor when no other ex-
ception applies. If an officer arrests in the same manner that is availa-
ble to a common citizen, then no governmental action has occurred
and the Fourth Amendment does not apply.
The social policies behind jurisdictional arrest statutes are very im-
portant and should be taken into account before a court finds that a
direct violation of state jurisdictional arrest statute is not constitution-
ally unreasonable. This analysis gives an officer ample protection
from personal liability. Moreover, the jurisdictional arrest exceptions
provide sufficient opportunity to find police conduct reasonable under
the totality of many extra-jurisdictional arrest circumstances. How-
ever, if in that rare situation no exclusion applies, the Fourth Amend-
ment should protect what it was drafted to protect-individual
freedom from unreasonable seizures. By requiring police officers to
follow their own respective jurisdictional limitations, courts promote
what is considered to be the reason for drafting the Fourth Amend-
ment-curtailing the unbridled use of police discretion. Following this
line of reasoning, courts encourage the use of arrest warrants and
teamwork involving extra-jurisdictional arrests. Courts would ad-
vance a safer society through cooperation instead of renegade police
action. Courts would also bring the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment back, which required probable cause as well as reasonable police
conduct. The social policies involved deserve an examination into
whether a direct violation of police extra-jurisdictional arrest, without
the existence of any exception, is per se unreasonable police conduct
and a violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Society is
expected to follow legislative rules and constitutional norms; there is
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no reason why governmental officials should not be required to do the
same.
38 9
Recall Officer Green from the hypothetical arrest situation at the
beginning of this Comment. Were Officer Green's actions objectively
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment? What if a suspect or many
suspects were killed? What if all the evidence absconded out the back
door? What if Officer Green had been killed? What if a child playing
in front of the house had been killed? Although probable cause ex-
isted for the arrest, is this how society wants its police officers to
behave?
There is no bright-line Fourth Amendment rule on unlawful, unwar-
ranted, extra-jurisdictional arrest; nor should there be. Yet, a total
blanket of inapplicability based upon the notion that the federal con-
stitution is not the enforcer of state law is inaccurate. In order to ap-
preciate this, a court must separate probable cause from
reasonableness. Only upon doing this, will a reviewing court realize
that what is constitutionally reasonable in one state may, in fact, be
constitutionally unreasonable in another state. This idea is seen when
examining inventory and administrative searches, searches incident to
arrest, and warrantless home entries to arrest.
Courts recognize the suggestion that state law influences the rea-
sonableness analysis in any extra-jurisdictional arrest case; however,
no court takes the next step. No court actually examines the interests
at stake. This Comment implores a sitting court to take a trip back in
time to determine whether unlawful, extra-jurisdictional arrests were
unlawful when the Fourth Amendment was framed. If this search is
unfruitful, this Comment implores a sitting court to conduct the bal-
ancing act required by the Fourth Amendment: society's protection
versus individual freedom and personal privacy. When a police officer
disregards the explicit jurisdictional authority codified within state
law, a court should examine the policies behind the violated state ex-
tra-jurisdictional statute and determine if any exception to jurisdiction
applies. If no exception applies, and the underlying legitimate govern-
mental interests are outweighed by an individual's right to freedom
and privacy, then the officer's conduct should be constitutionally un-
reasonable. If, however, individual interests and protections are out-
weighed by the governmental interests of societal protection, then an
officer's conduct would be constitutionally reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
389. See generally People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 84 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The Fourth Amendment is a cornerstone of our Constitution,
American society, and the American legal system. Because of its pro-
tections, all governmental agents are required to act in a constitution-
ally reasonable manner.39° It is time for a court to determine whether
an arrest in direct violation of some state extra-jurisdictional arrest
statute is constitutionally reasonable.
Nicholas L. Lopuszynski*
390. As Justice Brown succinctly stated in People v. McKay:
Requiring police to behave reasonably-i.e., to assess their conduct in light of all the
surrounding circumstances-is not asking too much. It is the same burden we impose
on every adult. The Constitution demands no less of the government.
McKay, 41 P.3d at 84 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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for helping me revise my writing and substantive analysis into publishable quality; Professor Ben
Alba for his stylistic and grammatical comments and insight; Professor Rodney Blackman for his
support and ideas; Karen DeGrand, partner at Donohue, Brown, Mathewson & Smyth, for her
assistance in writing style; Allison West and my family for their believable portrayal of one inter-
ested in Fourth Amendment analysis; and the DePaul Law Review editorial staff members for
their helpful insight, ideas, and confidence.
1400 [Vol. 53:1347
